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Closing the Divide between Negative and Positive Concepts of Liberty: How 
Contemporary American Speech Doctrines Reconcile the Classical Ideal of Liberty with 
the Reality of Social Intolerance
Chairman: Tom Huff
This thesis offers an analysis of two related, though incompatible, visions of how to 
politically secure the fundamentals of a peaceable human existence within the structure of 
government. Legal liberals, on one side of the debate, insist on a certain amount of 
official neutrality in order to safeguard certain liberties, promote certain values, and 
generally protect the political compromise from trends of social intolerance.
Alternatively, Critical Legal Studies advocates argue that real neutrality beneath the 
liberal conception of the rule of law is impossible, and insist that the claim of neutrality 
has the affect o f further oppressing the disadvantaged by ignoring their collective 
perspectives and experiences.
Within the United States, the issue of free speech has attracted much attention from both 
legal liberals and their CLS opponents, and the salient features of both visions of political 
life are illuminated by these debates over speech. This thesis seeks to analyze CLS 
criticisms of liberalism and identify how contemporary American speech doctrines have 
revitalized liberalism’s understanding of liberty through a greater appreciation of the 
associated principle of general tolerance. Tolerant speech law links negative and positive 
concepts of liberty by licensing the right to speak openly, protecting a zone of negative 
liberty, while encouraging a social atmosphere of tolerance in which trends of social 
intolerance can be checked and confined, which, in effect, supports a zone of positive 
liberty.
The political results of these philosophical debates directly and immediately effect how 
Americans live their lives and interact with others. Although most people desire the 
same result from a normative political philosophy -  a peaceable human existence within 
a well ordered society -  few Americans agree on how to politically achieve this goal. 
These debates between legal liberals and CLS over the limits of free speech force the 
average American to take a stand and defend his or her own value system. This process 
of defending ones’ own views while tolerating the opposing views of others, this thesis 
will argue, identifies the enduring relevance of liberal political philosophy in the lives of 
Americans.
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I. Introduction: Liberalism and Critical Legal Studies
The main intellectual transformation of sixteenth century Europe - the 
Reformation - undermined the shared moral foundation of the political state - the 
Catholic religion - as a prelude to substantive social/political change that overwhelmed 
the old structures of power. A new type of secular political philosophy -  liberalism - 
began to confront the problem of religious pluralism with the idea of a limited state. By 
the eighteenth century, the growing prominence of liberal theory revolutionized political 
thought by recognizing the power of self-government, casting aside political concepts 
such as divinely righted rule. The religious, political, and cultural diversity of both 
European and American societies positioned liberal theory -  and the rule of law -  as 
providing attractive theoretical principals on which to erect a governmental structure, 
principles which could mediate amongst competing conceptions o f the “good life” that 
naturally emerge from within a pluralist society. Liberal theorists began to envision 
pluralist societies bound by a shared commitment to such values as individual liberty, 
which would allow citizens to decide the nature of their own interests, and to pursue and 
protect those interests, within a stable framework of legal norms.'
By the late twentieth century, however, a group of legal scholars, members of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement [hereafter CLS], emerged from within the liberal 
tradition to accuse liberal political practice of using its values to offer only a truncated 
vision of political life to those less privileged who are often unable to share in the fruits 
of liberalism. These critics argue, in particular, that liberalism’s ideal of the rule of law 
is, in practice, incompatible with the liberal political ideals necessary for pluralism. 
According to these critics, liberal law is sufficiently indeterminate - that it is often
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arbitrary in interpretation and enforcement. Liberal claims of liberty, equality, neutrality, 
and tolerance are judged by these critics as unrealized in practice, masking the systemic 
oppression under which Western, liberal democracies’ disfavored and disempowered 
citizens live. These critics attempt to expose one of the most cherished liberal political 
and legal ideals -  the rule of law - as one instrument of this oppression, an instrument 
which is seen as shutting out the less privileged from the legal and therefore the political 
process under the guise of neutrality. CLS argues that a truly just, normative political 
philosophy must more honestly address the oppressive effects brought about by liberal 
claims of legal neutrality in order to more fairly serve the political needs of the less 
privileged.
This thesis seeks to identify and analyze one important disagreement between 
traditional liberals and CLS, viz., the disagreement over whether, and to what extent, a 
liberal state should tolerate intolerant speech. Tolerance is a certain value of liberalism, 
but the value is o f course abstract and difficult to define in specific cases. Reasonable 
people disagree over what it means to be a tolerant society and how tolerance is best 
achieved by government. In the American liberal tradition, modem speech doctrines 
articulate a specific vision of tolerance that has come to play a significant role in 
American life, especially since the early twentieth century. This unique vision of tolerant 
speech law, this thesis will argue, has helped to revitalize classical notions of liberty 
within American society. The institution of free speech, some liberals have argued, has 
helped Americans internalize the value of tolerance, thus helping society to reflect a more 
consistent vision of liberal political morality. American speech doctrines, they insist, 
offer a compelling statement o f tolerance that has a direct impact on other areas of social
3
life. Thus, free speech has come to mean more in American life than simply the licensing 
of the individual to freely speak his or her own mind, though that is certainly part of its 
appeal. American speech doctrine’s vision of tolerance on this modem view has, in 
particular, helped to create a social atmosphere in which trends of intolerance, such as 
racism, sexism, and other forms of bigotry, can be openly checked and confined, thus 
providing a zone of positive liberty, while preserving the individual license of negative 
liberty.
By contrast, some American legal scholars identified with Critical Race Theory 
[CRT], who share CLS’s principal deconstructive arguments, mount serious challenges to 
American speech doctrines, offering an alternative vision of what tolerance means and 
how it should be reflected in the law. While utilizing CLS’s general criticisms of liberal 
theory, CRT makes more specific, race conscious, criticisms of American speech law, 
often in preparation for proposals to regulate hate speech. This thesis seeks to defend 
American speech doctrines by arguing the negative consequences of any regime of hate 
speech regulations. In doing so, the analysis offered here seeks to show that 
contemporary American speech doctrines have actually helped American society to more 
fully realize an inclusive vision of its liberal political ideals by exhibiting an 
extraordinary level of tolerance in this one domain of human activity supporting both 
negative and positive aspects of liberty.
This thesis is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of either liberalism or 
CLS, but is intended to present a framework in which to explore the theoretical appeal 
and practical value of liberal political and legal philosophy in general, and American 
speech doctrine in particular, in light of some serious criticisms. The initial analysis in
4
this thesis of some key differences between liberals and CLS, seeks to establish the 
general political and legal perspectives of these two related traditions, in preparation for 
considering two conflicting visions of the tolerance of intolerant speech in American 
speech doctrine. Dean Lee Bollinger, in The Tolerant Society, and Professor Mary J. 
Matsuda, in Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim’s Story, provide 
these two conflicting visions of what it means to be tolerant and how to achieve the goal 
of tolerance through speech doctrine.1 The disagreement between Bollinger’s and 
Matsuda’s visions of speech tolerance reflects the general disagreements between legal 
liberals and CLS. They disagree over whether or not liberal speech doctrines are capable 
of protecting the politically weak. The analysis here will defend the liberal position 
presented by Bollinger and point out the deficiencies of the CRT position presented by 
Matsuda. In sum, this thesis seeks to demonstrate that American political and legal 
doctrines have been revitalized through the principle of general tolerance. I will argue, in 
short, that this current balance of liberal values reflected in American speech doctrines 
does a better job of protecting people from each other and the state than the alternative 
vision of CRT.
II. A Generic Vision of Liberalism
As a normative political philosophy, liberal theory is primarily concerned with 
analyzing the values that determine the relationships between autonomous individuals, 
social factions, and the state in order to develop general rules by which people of 
different beliefs and cultures can live together peacefully. Liberal theory often envisions
1 Lee Bollinger, The Tolerant Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Reprint, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988); Mari Matsuda, “Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The
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a state with limited, enumerated powers, administered by separate co-equal government 
institutions that are bound by the rule of law as the best way to manage conflicting 
individual interests while securing a modem vision of liberty for a pluralist society. By 
reflecting these political ideals in their institutions, liberal states are able regulate 
individual, social, and governmental relationships with the limited exercise of coercive 
state power, and are thus usually able to manage social controversy by peaceful, political 
means. Pluralist societies bound by a vision of liberty, liberals believe, will be prudent in 
the exercise of state power and will thus protect the prerogatives, and outline the 
obligations, fundamental to each citizen’s pursuit of the good-life from one generation to 
the next.
For liberals, then, facilitating each individual’s pursuit of the good-life requires 
more from a state than rigidly maintaining any present conception of the good. Indeed, 
any liberal definition of the good-life must allow for change. In Liberalism. Community 
and Culture. Will Kymlicka describes the pursuit of the good-life as more than freedom 
to lead the life now believed to be good and indicates that it is important to liberals that 
individuals retain the option to decide when current pursuits are not good.2 Kymlicka 
asserts that the essence of the good-life is in the freedom of each individual to change his 
or her own mind about what life to lead.3 Accepting the possibility of mistakes and 
conversions makes a big difference in how people deliberate on the scope of liberty and 
the limits of government power.
Victim’s Story,” Michigan Law Review vol. 87:2320 (August 1989).
2 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989; Reprint, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 10.
3 Ibid.
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For Kymlicka, deliberations on the good-life are more than utilitarian 
determinations on how to maximize the current ends of an individual.4 The good-life is 
more abstract and is not necessarily the life an individual now leads, or is able to 
currently identify as good.5 For instance, someone may become a successful lawyer and 
then decide that reading philosophy is more valuable. The chance that an individual 
becomes a great lawyer is not justification in itself for becoming a lawyer. The chance of 
failure, however, is a good reason for avoiding that field altogether. For liberals, state 
and social determinations on the value of the lives of lawyers and philosophers should not 
impede the decision of the individual to pursue either goal. A person can only lead the 
good-life according to his or her own beliefs and values, and although liberals assume 
that anyone may be wrong about beliefs or values, it does not follow that society, or its 
institutions, can lead an individual’s life by requiring certain beliefs. Human decisions 
are often temporary, or just flawed, and liberal institutions are seen as protecting each 
individual’s liberties of conscience against intolerant social tendencies that sometimes 
endeavor to quiet dissent, or eradicate perceived human error, through the use of state 
power.
Kymlicka's explanation of the role of the good-life in liberal theory suggests that 
this aspect of the self, the self-conscience, should be protected by a liberal government 
through a civil liberty that licenses certain individual actions and a civil right that should 
not be infringed upon by others actions. For liberals, then, the political commitment to 
protecting freedoms of conscience does not simply liberate the individual from external 
constraints. It also binds each individual to certain shared political values, like equal
4 Ibid. 11.
5 Ibid.
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liberty of conscience. Liberals assume that a plurality of individuals attempting to protect 
their own liberty will cooperate politically to ensure equal liberty for each other from one 
generation to the next. Liberals in a pluralist society believe that shared liberty is more 
conducive to social cooperation and individual flourishing than shared ideology. Liberty 
and equality are not mutually exclusive values, and liberals believe that these values can 
be reconciled within an atmosphere that liberates individuals from social conventions 
while binding them together politically.
To balance the liberties and duties of diverse individuals pursuing their own 
personal interests, liberal theory articulates social rules to address the fundamental 
dilemma faced by modem, pluralist states. Every citizen has individual interests while 
remaining dependent on others for cooperation. This social dilemma can cause tension 
between individuals. Liberals believe pluralist societies require a workable, though 
“thin,” notion of political morality as the basis of a constitutional government in order to 
fairly mediate amongst the various, independent “thick” notions of the good-life that 
individuals express. Different individuals often have conflicting, sometimes 
incommensurable, ideologies and life-plans within a pluralist setting. Thus, liberal theory 
mediates the social tensions of pluralism by developing a set of rules that focus on the 
merely political values while bracketing other more comprehensive and controversial 
value systems that reflect personal beliefs and life-style choices.1
To respect these political aims, John Rawls argues, in his essay The Idea o f An 
Overlapping Consensus, that a thin set of shared values must not rest on a convergence of 
self-or group-interests, the fortunate outcome of political bargaining, or a general 
comprehensive religion or philosophy, but must instead rely on an overlapping consensus
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of reasonable political conceptions of liberty and justice.6 Through this idea of 
overlapping consensus, Rawls describes generally how it is conceptually possible to 
fairly manage relationships between individuals with different thick notions of the good. 
Essentially, the ideal of an overlapping consensus asks what is the least that can be 
asserted politically by a reasonable plurality with the least philosophical controversy.
This agreement is thus not entirely contingent on a particular historical event such as a 
Constitutional Congress. The agreement instead relies on the general historical and 
cultural recognition that no arrangement, other than one based on liberal political 
morality, makes sense.7
The fact of pluralism and the goal of achieving this overlapping consensus thus 
subordinate, for political purposes, all comprehensive ideologies to a very limited liberal 
political morality, which protects certain liberties of conscience and other basic civil
o
rights like political equality. A liberal political consensus, however, need not be 
indifferent to, or skeptical of, comprehensive ideologies. All comprehensive ideologies 
that accept liberal political principles are equally acceptable. The principle of an 
overlapping consensus seeks to reduce political reliance on the details of these 
ideological controversies as much as possible. For example, the political morality of 
equal liberty of conscience removes religious truths from the political agenda, and equal 
political and civil rights also removes serfdom and slavery from the agenda. The precise 
contours of equality, liberty, and justice remain open for political debate while other 
controversies remain closed, outside the political process -  bracketed, so to speak.
6 John Rawls, “The Idea o f  An Overlapping Consensus,” Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 7, no. 1 (1987):
2 .
7 Ibid. 6.
8 Ibid.
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An overlapping consensus is not dependent on the distribution of wealth or 
power, Rawls explains, but is accepted by individuals and groups within society for its 
own sake.9 When a consensus is seen as fair and equitable to all parties, regardless of 
position, then those who agree to the thin political morality will not withdraw support 
should the relative strength or weakness of their position change in relation to the rest of 
society. In this sense, Rawls rejects the conception of a liberal state as a mere modus 
vivendi, an unsteady treaty between potentially hostile entities, such as is found in 
Hobbes’ Leviathan.10 Reasonableness, a sense of fairness, and a respect for others,
Rawls argues, leads to a social consensus able to identify and resolve the most urgent 
political issues and maintain cooperation and general tolerance over time.11 Consensus 
on this thin notion of the good, liberals like Rawls believe, can establish a basis for the 
constitutional essentials of a pluralist society, and thus politically balance the civil 
liberties and civil rights crucial to the long-term social stability of a liberal, democratic 
state.12
To be effective and just, liberals like Rawls insist, state institutions must, amongst 
other things, respect the rule of law as an embodiment of this tacit social agreement. A 
liberal version of the rule of law, in turn, must respect two significant principles: fair 
notice and legal accountability.11' The principle o f fair notice requires the state to 
enumerate the rights of citizens, clearly defining the domains of human activity 
susceptible to government regulation. Fair notice, then, allows people to order their lives 
with the knowledge of government requirements and prohibitions without the fear of ex
9 Ibid. 10.
10 Ibid. 10-17.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid. 5.
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post facto reprisals.13 The principle of legal accountability requires that any discharge of 
government power be based in a preexisting, legally authoritative norm -  a constitution 
or a statuelv -  so that those responsible for the discharge of government power remain 
accountable to the system they represent, and not their own individual notions of right 
and wrong. The state’s implementation and maintenance of authorative norms also 
requires ideologically neutral and non-controversial methods of reasoning accessible to 
the public.
Thus, Rawls argues that an agreement over a thin conception of political justice is 
of no effect without a companion agreement on the guidelines o f public inquiry and the 
rules for assessing evidence.14 An agreement over the acceptable content of public 
reason is necessary for an informed public, and is also important so as to not reintroduce 
controversial issues bracketed by the consensus. The fact of pluralism, Rawls argues, 
demands that guidelines and rules be accessible to common sense forms of reasoning, and 
by procedures and conclusions of science when uncontroversial.15 The esoteric claims 
and customs of religion or philosophy are not excluded from the public domain out of 
skepticism or indifference, but these claims remain bracketed and beyond the scope of the 
institution of public reason.16 For instance, the evidence used in criminal trials and 
congressional investigations should be based on the shared procedures of science rather 
than scripture or superstition.
Additionally, arguments justifying political and legal judgments should not only 
be scientifically sound, but should be seen by the public as sound. Laws must not be
13 Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; 
Third Edition Reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 23-24.
14 Rawls, “The Idea o f An Overlapping Consensus,” 20.
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written in dead languages nor may political party platforms remain secretive and known 
only to members. Rawls cites the maxim that justice must not only be done, but must be
• 17seen to be done by the public. Agreement over public reason encourages legal and 
political institutions to justify the reasoning of their arguments to an informed public who 
will in turn have a certain amount of influence in the political arena of a free state. This 
standard of public reason allows citizens to understand and influence the workings of 
government, and insures social allegiance to a reasonable, transparent state.
Society then agrees to comply with the law and operate within the consensus 
system, and the state agrees to observe four forms of neutrality that justify the limited 
exercise of state power over the lives of citizens: rights neutrality, epistemological 
neutrality, political neutrality, and legal neutrality.v These four forms of liberal neutrality 
authorize government coercion within certain narrow domains of human activity, but not 
others. Liberal neutrality affirms the necessity of a limited set of enforceable legal 
obligations within a well-ordered-society. Liberalism, thus, politically licenses 
government coercion to maintain order and security while tolerating various individual 
value judgments that do not threaten this order and security. Liberal theory requires, for 
example, government restraint and toleration in areas of social discourse such as political 
speech while restricting some conspiratorial speech that would directly undermine the 
state.
To further limit the power of government institutions and maintain the four forms 
of neutrality, liberal theory often requires an intra-government relationship of checks and 
balances. For example, in the U.S. system, liberal theory is manifest in the manner to
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. 21.
which lines are drawn between the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of 
government. The political process is intended to provide a settlement over disputed 
social matters that grow from the competing social groups’ normative visions, and the 
legal process simply interprets and applies the settlement even handedly to individual 
cases while guaranteeing that the fundamental liberal compromise is secure. Judges 
interpret the law in reference to specific cases brought before the court. The judiciary 
does not seek out problems to solve, but, instead, enforces the dictates of the social 
compromise in response to specific litigants in specific cases. In doing so, the judiciary 
clarifies the enforceable limits of the law through interpretation and application, but is 
discouraged from expanding or restricting those legal limits for extra-legal political 
purposes.
Maintaining the principle of legal neutrality is thus important to a pluralist society 
bound primarily by a thin political morality. The liberal doctrine of “legal formalism” 
explains how judicial independence is possible within the contentious political world of a 
liberal state. Traditional legal formalism claims legal rules form a consistent and 
complete whole from which the answer to legal questions can be determined by 
discovering the applicable rule or standard and applying it to the facts of a particular
I ftcase. Liberal theory therefore asserts that a cognizable difference exists between legal 
and political decisions, and this doctrine of formalism describes how judicial decisions 
can be effectively insulated from the political process. Liberals who cite legal formalism 
cannot claim, however, that the structure of legal doctrine is specified with complete 
exactness. Judges often disagree over the principles that constitute various departments 
of doctrine -  evidenced through dissenting opinions, reversals of lower courts, and the
13
like -  however, disagreement takes place within the context of substantial agreement.19 
This substantial agreement over most areas o f the law, according to the doctrine of legal 
formalism, provides sufficient guidance to allow judges to develop and maintain a 
relatively consistent body of law that is insulated from the political process by various 
judicial requirements and restraints.vl
All of these formal elements of liberal theory’s rule of law are intended to balance 
relationships and limit power. Individuals, groups, and institutions are all bound by 
similar limiting legal principles, binding society with a thin conception of political life. 
Other attempts to bind large, cosmopolitan societies with a comprehensive or thick vision 
of political life have failed and will likely fail in the future.20 Binding large, pluralist 
societies with a general comprehensive conception of life can only be maintained with 
the unfettered exercise of state power, and this strategy is inherently oppressive and 
unstable. Liberal theory thus offers a more flexible template of organization that loosely 
binds society with a thin vision of political life based on consensus and, more recently, 
general tolerance.
A number of problems arise, however, if  liberalism’s general, theoretical model is
7 1taken to reflect the daily realities of modem liberal political and legal institutions. Most 
modem liberal political and legal institutions routinely violate the conditions of this 
theoretical model. For example, laws and statutes are often written in vague, open-ended 
language that sometimes encourages authoritative interpretations to take advantage of
18 Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 79.
19 Ibid. 182.
20 Rawls, “The Idea o f  An Overlapping Consensus,” 23.
21 Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 27.
14
22controversial conceptions of justice, apparently violating the law/politics distinction.
The courts sometimes independently restructure legal doctrines in areas like tort and 
contract law based on controversial legal principles, again, apparently violating the
'j'l
doctrine of legal formalism. The extensive discretion of administrative and regulatory 
agencies in carrying out these vague, sometimes conflicting, legislative and legal 
mandates has the effect that these agencies enact rules with the force of law and 
adjudicate disputes that arise from the application of these rules, apparently violating 
such fundamental liberal political values such as the principle of due process, legal 
accountability, and fair notice.24
III. Critical Legal Studies General Criticisms of Liberalism
The Critical Legal Studies movement contends that these and other routine 
violations of liberalism’s generic model render the theory conceptually incoherent, or at 
least seriously undermine liberalism’s claim of the ability, as a normative political 
philosophy, to effectively protect people from each other and the government. These 
critics often accuse legal liberals of being unrealistic, and even dishonest, in their 
assessments of the rule of law. Through the development and interpretation of the law, 
CLS argues, the social and economic elites of liberal states, like the United States, 
dominate the political and therefore the legal processes in pursuit of their own, narrow 
class interests.25 Many CLS scholars attempt to establish that liberal law and its ideals 
are not universal proclamations with broad social benefits, and, instead, argue that liberal
22 Ibid. 28.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid. 7-9.
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laws often operate as protectionist, exclusionary doctrines that feign generality, 
neutrality, and tolerance. CLS thus challenges liberalism’s most basic claims of 
government neutrality in the development and application of the law, and further 
contends that even if liberal law functioned according to the stipulations of liberal theory, 
then, still, liberal law is ill-suited to satisfy the demands of liberal political morality in the 
context of pluralism. CLS provides this alternative analysis of liberal legal theory and 
pluralism, often in preparation for arguments that call for legal reform. And, although the 
legal prescriptions vary greatly from scholar to scholar, making generalizations difficult, 
some thematic generalizations concerning the main CLS criticisms of liberalism’s 
conception of the rule of law are a useful introduction into the generally deconstructive 
goals of the movement.
According to Andrew Altman in his book Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal 
Critique. CLS offers three main criticisms of liberal legal theory. CLS attacks, initially, 
the reasoning behind the liberal conception of the rule of law, insisting that the synthesis 
of liberalism, the rule of law, and pluralism makes the goal of neutrality impossible.26 
Second, CLS criticizes the rules and doctrines that comprise the laws of countries like the 
United States, and insist that any body of well developed liberal law will be so riddled 
with inconsistencies and indeterminacies that it provides those who interpret and apply 
the law with the means to justify alternative legal decisions, undermining the liberal
77promise of a determinate legal outcome within a neutral system. The third attack 
condemns the social reality created by the liberal conception of the rule of law as 
inherently oppressive, insisting that liberal states create a legal, and therefore a political,
26 Ibid. 13.
27 Ibid. 14.
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atmosphere which disempowers individuals from accomplishing political changes
? o
through the legal system.
According to Altman, the CLS movement can be divided into two wings that
9Qfundamentally disagree over the deconstructive goals of the movement. In its most 
radical form, CLS contends that the liberal vision of the rule of law is a “myth,” that has 
no resemblance to the actual operations of liberal legal systems. These radical 
deconstructive arguments deny that any social institution, including the law, can have an
<2 i
objective structure that determines human behavior. By contrast, the more moderate 
strand of CLS seeks to show that official decisions within any liberal system are 
inescapably and inevitably going to reflect the moral and political beliefs of those in 
power, especially at the margins, effectively disempowering the politically weak. 
Moderate CLS thus holds that liberal law does indeed have a structure with imbedded 
meaning, but this structure is often the function of certain controversial and limited
33ethical perspectives that truncate the political and legal choices of the politically weak.
The analysis in thesis will focus on the more moderate CLS arguments.
A. First Criticism
CLS’s first main criticism of liberal theory - in essence, the impossibility of 
combining the theoretical components of liberalism, the rule of law, and pluralism in a 
neutral governmental system -  is itself composed of three connected, though distinct,
28 Ibid. 15.
29 Ibid. 3.
30 Ibid. 10.
31 Ibid. 19.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
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deconstructive arguments.34 The first of these criticisms claims that within a context of 
cultural, religious, and ethnic pluralism no neutral process can exist for enacting liberal 
legal rules in the legislative arena.35 According to this view, those with public power 
inevitably develop legal rules and doctrines in accordance with their own personal 
interests, thereby infusing the normative structure of the law with the subjective values of 
those in power, undercutting liberal neutrality in the creation of the law.36
The second strand of this first argument contends that even if  laws could be 
developed in an atmosphere of moral and philosophical neutrality, then, still, the 
interpretations of those laws, by the judiciary, would inevitably share the extra-legal - 
moral or political - perspectives of judges. According to this claim, the custodians of 
judicial authority within a liberal state will inevitably impose their perspective in the 
interpretation of the law under the auspices of legal neutrality. Within a context of 
moral and political pluralism, CLS claims, liberal assertions about the independence of 
legal reasoning from the political and ethical choices of those in power are simply 
unrealistic and therefore untrue. All law is political, and cannot be otherwise. Although 
most moderate CLS advocates dismiss the more radical charge that liberal laws are 
devoid of all determinate meaning, which would render all legal interpretations as 
arbitrary, many of these same advocates claim that it is impossible to rid legal 
interpretations, especially at the margins, of the moral and political concerns and 
perspectives o f judges.
34 Ibid. 13.
35 Ibid. 14.
36 Ibid. 13.
37 Ibid. 14.
18
One specific variant of these two connected moderate criticisms cited by Altman 
is drawn from CLS author Robert Unger’s influential works Knowledge and Politics and 
Law in Modem Society, which claim that liberal legal theory is unable to provide a
- jo  _
consistent account of the connection between legal rules and individual values. If 
values are subjective, the argument claims, then “values based” rules have no objective
OQ
meaning beyond the choices of individuals in power. Altman points to two 
consequences of this “subjectivity of values” claim that Unger attributes to liberalism: the 
antinomy of legislation and the antimony of rules and values. The first of Unger’s 
antimonies, according to Altman, concerns the process by which legal rules are enacted, 
and insists that no process can satisfy the demands of liberal political morality for neutral 
legislation.40 The second antimony concerns the process by which legal rules are 
interpreted, and insists that no process can satisfy the demands of liberal political 
morality for neutral legal interpretation 41 Both antinomies reveal that liberal states are 
incapable of bracketing thick notions of the good because legislators and judges who 
develop and interpret the law, knowingly or unknowingly, smuggle subjective value 
judgments into the law, and this state of affairs contradicts liberalism’s promise of 
political and legal neutrality.
Due to these antinomies, according to Unger’s arguments, no neutral structure can 
exist to fairly guide the legislative and judicial processes 42 The subjective value 
judgments of legislators and judges, who are predominantly lawyers, are embedded in the 
law. The lawyer/layman distinction shuts the public out of the legislative and judicial
38 Ibid. 59.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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systems with esoteric legal language and the arcane procedures endemic to both liberal 
institutions. Furthermore, Unger and other CLS critics argue that legislators and judges 
share similar educational and socio-economic backgrounds, which makes the law only 
seem as though it has a neutral structure, when, in reality, the law is simply a collection 
of similar, shared subjective value judgments generated by one class of citizens and then 
applied to others who have little or no influence.43
The subjectivity of values argument, according to Altman, raises two crucial 
problems for liberal theory: first, how can order be established and maintained without a 
neutral set of values to standardize legislative and legal rules, and second, how can the 
establishment and maintenance of social order, based on a systematic pattern of 
subjective value judgments, avoid unjustifiably subjugating the rest of society to the 
values of those in power.44 Liberal legal theory is committed to solving these two 
problems of order and freedom in a pluralist setting. However, the subjectivity of values 
indicated by the antimony of legislation and the antinomy of rules and values, Unger 
believes, undercuts liberalism’s claims of political and legal neutrality, and, thus, 
undercuts liberalism’s solution to the problems of order and freedom in the context of 
pluralism.45
Altman suggests, for instance, that proponents of laissez-faire economics and 
defenders of the welfare state seldom agree on principles of justice because they have 
different value systems. Similarly, abortion advocates and opponents can never be 
reconciled through either state action or inaction. One side will always feel as though
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. 60.
45 Ibid. 61.
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their values are unrepresented by the official position on these controversies. Custom and 
class-based consensus, CLS critics charge, are the basis for liberal institutions rather than 
any neutral set of rules that could satisfy everyone’s understandings of right and wrong.46 
Some subjective value judgments of the ruling class would have broad support in most 
pluralist settings, like prohibitions against theft and murder, but other more controversial 
value judgments on important issues like welfare and abortion will be settled by those 
who make and interpret the law, most of whom are biased toward specific value 
judgments, rather than being settled by society at large. The fact of pluralism combined 
with these kinds of antimonies makes the application of rule of law unavoidably biased. 
Additionally, Unger claims that the liberal rule of law is in fact a theoretically incoherent 
concept because the diverse, subjective value judgments of a given population could 
never realistically reach consensus on what rules should guide political life 47 This 
incoherence, according to Unger, destabilizes social order and undermines the notion of 
freedom defended by Rawls’ understanding of the overlapping consensus, for example.
The third strand of this first CLS criticism adds that the liberal attempt to 
distinguish between law and politics in a pluralist setting undermines the neutrality 
principle, or the four forms of neutrality, by endorsing a particular conception o f the good 
life over other competing conceptions. In this view, the maintenance of the neutrality 
principle is a form of normative protectionism that allows certain moral and political 
belief systems to maintain hegemony over others, capitalism over other less productive 
economic systems, for example. This liberal bias, according to the CLS view, places 
certain normative conceptions of how society should be ordered above others from the
46 Ibid. 72.
47 Ibid.
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beginning and maintains this normative partiality at the expense of real neutrality.
Liberal law cannot provide a neutral process for the development and maintenance of the 
law, and, thus, breaks down beneath the weight of its own claim to neutrality.
All of these related criticisms deny that liberal legal theory can provide any clear 
distinction between thick and thin conceptions of the good for those who create and those 
who interpret law. Additionally, these three arguments charge that even if those 
distinctions do hold, the mere imposition of a legal system is an exercise o f political 
power that discriminates against other possible conceptions of social regulation - 
concepts that would abolish all law, for instance - making any legal system incompatible 
with neutrality. Thus, liberalism requires neutrality for the development and 
interpretation of laws and legal doctrines, and CLS denies that the liberal rule of law can 
achieve this neutrality. Some individuals and groups possess an inordinate amount of 
power within any pluralist society. Those individuals concretize power in the law and 
maintain a social hierarchy reinforced through the legal system. Liberalism masks its 
inherently oppressive nature, according to these moderate CLS arguments, by claiming 
distinctions and principles that are, in fact, misleading.
CLS is correct that absolute government neutrality on every issue is impossible. 
However, liberalism never claims this level of neutrality in theory or practice. Liberal 
theory unapologetically embraces the idea that modem nation states, faced with 
pluralism, must rely on a single set of legal rules to deal with society’s members in a fair 
manner. Thus, the establishment and maintenance of any legal system will be a political 
act lacking absolute neutrality in the sense that it repudiates the idea that law should not 
regulate society. The standards by which liberal states are structured are liberal
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standards, showing a deliberate liberal bias. By design, liberal neutrality protects certain 
values from conceptions of political life that deny these values.
Liberalism rejects the notion that there is only one way to live while accepting the 
notion that persons holding a plurality of views can live by a single set of shared legal 
rules that are fair. Liberalism does not search for some type of “libertine” neutrality that 
disregards individual responsibilities. Liberals, instead, believe that some things are bad 
and unjust, murder for example, and further believe that some things are good and just, 
religious tolerance for example. Liberals believe that a state can legitimately promote 
religious tolerance while forbidding human sacrifice and still remain neutral toward 
religious pursuits that are reasonable. The overlapping consensus removes some 
conceptions of political life from serious debate because some conceptions of political 
life are inconsistent with the political ideals of liberal theory and the cultural values of a 
particular society.
Liberalism is not necessarily committed to the doctrine o f total moral subjectivity. 
Many liberals believe that a thin notion of political morality can be developed that places
Aftnormative constraints on individual choices. If by “objective values” CLS critics such 
as Unger mean a ‘thing’ independent of the historical human condition, then Altman 
admits that none exists.49 Liberal legal theory only demands that the law have some kind 
of normative structure embodied in legal rules, which are independent of the way any 
particular individual conceives them through their own subjective value system.50 
Liberalism takes seriously the disagreement and controversies that arise out of this less
48 Ibid. 71.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid. 81.
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than perfect situation.51 Modem liberals like Altman and Rawls admit that legal and 
political institutions do not embody objective ‘truth,’ but insist, rather, that liberal 
institutions embody a workable and defensible, historically contingent, compromise to 
which people with different values can agree, despite their own truths independently 
defined.52
For example, Marxism has been politically unsuccessful in the United States 
because the liberal tradition allowed for social and economic reform by peaceful, 
constitutional means. The abuses and injustice of nineteenth and early twentieth 
century American capitalism forced a political compromise with Marxist economics 
without the need for a violent political revolution. Neither lasseze-faire capitalists nor 
Marxists will be completely satisfied with the political outcome of this compromise, just 
as many pro- and anti-abortion forces are dissatisfied with Roe v. Wade and the 
exceptions that followed this case. It should be clear, however, that the American liberal 
tradition is capable of dealing with controversial economic and moral issues.
Admittedly, even when the system generally works well, legal convention can 
break-down at the margins, but even in these situations, Altman points out, legal 
reasoning must cohere at least substantially with settled law in a way not required of 
political reasoning.54 Legal formalism requires legal reasoning to operate under a “fit” 
requirement. In most cases, when judicial convention is strong, formalism requires a 
“maximum fit” with settled law.55 In some cases, when judicial convention breaks down
51 Ibid. 71.
52 Ibid. 72.
53 William Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers, (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1951; Fourth 
Edition Reprint, New York: Hogarth Press, 1969), 701.
54 Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 185.
55 Ibid. 186.
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at the margins, formalism still requires a “substantial fit” with settled law. Political 
reasoning, on the other hand, is unconstrained by these “fit” requirements, and is free to 
raise or defend principles outside the bounds of legal reasoning.56 Thus, according to 
legal liberals like Altman, even at the margins where the law is less determinate, legal 
reasoning can be differentiated from political reasoning by this formalist requirement, 
and this difference in reasoning is all that liberalism claims or requires.57
Altman would not assert that it is possible in practice to insulate the legal process 
entirely from judgments about the relative value of views that compete in the political 
arena.58 Liberals concede that the principle of legal neutrality has an imperfect 
correspondence with practice, and further concede that any system of rules is incapable of 
promoting and protecting the public and private interests without some interpretation.
But, in general, most liberals make two claims concerning the infiltration of politics into 
the legal process. First, this infiltration is regrettable, but it is an inevitable consequence 
of the imperfection of the human condition. Second, infiltration can be kept to a 
minimum by a process that works, for the most part, without reference to such judgments. 
Thus, although self-conscious of the role of perspective, the liberal theory of judicial 
responsibility claims to minimize, not eliminate, reliance on any ideology that goes 
beyond the scope of legal formalism.
Perspective is of course important, and many judges do in fact come from similar 
socio-economic backgrounds and have similar educations as CLS charges, but this reality 
does not in principle bar any individual or group from the specialized trade of 
jurisprudence. Minorities, women, and many other people from poor and working-class
56 Ibid.
57 tu; î
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backgrounds have entered the legal profession, impacting the structure of legal doctrine 
with their perspectives, evidenced with the emergence of feminist legal scholarship and 
critical race theory. Many within the CLS movement are lawyers who come from similar 
socio-economic backgrounds and share similar educations. If CLS doubts the grass-roots 
support for elected or appointed judges’ value systems, then surely liberals must doubt 
the grass-roots support for values claimed by CLS. All people have perspective, and it is 
unsurprising that elected and appointed judges make judgments reflecting their 
perspectives, which are sometimes controversial, but Americans hope and expect that 
judges will try to carry out a liberal agenda when interpreting and applying the law 
despite specific moral and political predispositions. The principle of legal neutrality does 
not exist solely within the character of a specific judge, although it should reside there 
also, but exists primarily within the objective structure of the American legal system that 
is checked and balanced by other private and public institutions intrinsic to liberalism and 
American tradition.
B. Second Criticism 
The second main criticism of liberalism by CLS claims that liberal laws and 
doctrines are littered with contradictions and indeterminacies. One variant of this 
argument contends that liberal states have developed a patchwork of legal doctrines that 
allows reasoning to justify contradictory legal decisions. This so-called “patchwork 
thesis” regarding liberal law is a combination of two claims. According to Altman, CLS 
first claims that “it is impossible to rationally reconstruct a body of liberal legal doctrine
58 Ibid. 27.
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by deriving its norms from a complete, consistent set of underlying principles.”59 And, 
second, CLS claims that “the reason for this impossibility is that to reconstruct certain 
elements of the doctrine will require principles from a certain ethical view point, while 
reconstructing other elements will require contradictory principles from an incompatible 
ethical view point.”60
CLS asserts that the implications of the patchwork thesis challenge liberal theory 
because different judges choosing different underlying principles in similar legal contexts 
undermine the possibility of a determinate legal outcome. Furthermore, if this criticism 
is true, then liberal legal systems allow judges the leeway within their decisions to 
express, consciously or not, their personal moral and political ideals, weakening legal 
neutrality.61 In such a situation, the argument claims, the law lacks any cogent basis to 
neutrally guide judicial decisions, essentially forcing legal reasoning to draw upon extra- 
legal concerns to fill the structural void. A legal system with such indeterminacy would, 
in other words, enable lawyers to represent either side of a legal case with equally 
convincing, yet contradictory arguments.
The claims of the patchwork thesis, however, are not necessarily inconsistent with 
liberal theory. While liberal legal theory does claim that the law is conceptually derived 
from a single, coherent ethical view-point contained in an overlapping consensus, it 
admits of some indeterminacy at the margins. Supposing that different principles do in 
fact undergird different sections of legal doctrine at the margins, Altman uses the 
examples of individualism and altruism, it cannot be shown that the acceptance of one
59 Ibid. 117.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid. 15.
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principle logically requires the rejection of the other.62 Liberal law is intended to 
confront the dichotomies and contradictions of pluralist social life, and seeks to balance 
such ethical dilemmas such as tolerance/intolerance, liberty/equality, and 
individualism/altruism through the rules and standards of law. Thus, the rational 
application of liberal law may indeed require the introduction of coordinating principles 
at the margins, but it is a mistake for CLS to assume these principles contradictory in 
more circumstances than they are complementary.
Although liberal law is admittedly indeterminate in some instances, it is an 
exaggeration to assume that judges are free to pick whatever principle they please when 
deciding most cases. It cannot be shown that equally forceful legal arguments can be 
given on both sides in most legal cases.64 Generally, one side of a legal argument has a 
greater logical fit with the law. The appropriate legal argument for a judge in most cases 
would be the one that fits best with the decisions and norms of the settled law, and not 
simply the one that the judge prefers for political reasons. However, in other instances, at 
the margins where the law is less determinate, a judge has more discretion, but not 
complete discretion. Even if  the patchwork thesis is partially true, then the law might be 
seen as subtly indeterminate at the margins, yet still largely determinant at the core.
Liberals have shown how modem liberal states are able to conform to liberal 
notions of the mle of law by making room in liberal theory for more indeterminacy than 
any strict formalism would seem to allow.65 Liberals thus contend that liberal theory is 
generally able to fulfill many political and legal promises to citizens despite operational
62 Ibid. 122-123.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid. 119.
65 Ibid. 29.
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imperfections. Liberals concede that, because of the nature of human language, any 
normative political philosophy must necessarily allow areas of indeterminacy.66 
Although the level of legal indeterminacy within any contemporary liberal system of law 
is significant, liberals contend that indeterminacies are peripheral to the overall structure 
of the law in most instances.67 Some level of indeterminacy and discretion is desirable in 
practice, liberals believe, because it gives institutions the flexibility needed to deal with 
social controversy, in the short-term, without destroying core principle of liberty in the
tong-term. Liberals thus argue that it is a mistake for CLS to expect strict compliance in
•  68 practice to any formalist model.
C. Final Criticism
CLS’s final criticism is connected in important ways to the first two criticisms of 
the liberal conception of the rule of law.69 Dealing primarily with the nature of social 
reality, this criticism insists that any claim to a neutral, liberal legal system serves as a 
“red herring” that allows those with power to retain power and impose their political and 
moral views on the rest of society, perpetuating relatively fixed relations of power 
beneath the cover of an illusionary liberal neutrality. CLS claims that it is impossible to 
satisfy the requirements of the rule of law and the demands of liberal political morality. 
The belief in the liberal rule of law itself, according to CLS, maintains oppressive power 
structures that bar disempowered groups from attaining their rightful share of power,
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid. 149.
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thereby stifling immediate political and social change for those who want change. Legal 
institutions stifle the context-transcending capacity of humans by regarding the terms of 
life and the context within which it unfolds as part of the natural order, and by embedding 
this general sense o f normalcy into the law, liberalism denies the truly marginalized the
<7 A
opportunity to see the possibility of social change through the law.
Contrary to liberal assertions, the rules that make up the, law, according to CLS, 
have no independent authority over individual’s lives, but the law is used as an
71instrument by those in power to manipulate others into behaving in a certain way. The 
law is simply a tool of the subjective value judgments of those in power. Altman refers 
to this view as the “instrumentalist view” of social rules.72 With this instrumentalist 
view, CLS charges that if the law is a tool of manipulation, then liberal legal theory’s 
insistence that legal rules can protect individuals from each other and the state, in reality, 
helps to hide the dominant position of those in power and the subordinate position of 
those without power.73 Thus, CLS critics argue, for example, that the principle of stare 
decisis allows judges to manipulate precedent to legally rationalize decisions reached for 
other, extra-legal reasons.v"
CLS thus adopts a position it calls “rule skepticism.” The moderate CLS position 
on rule skepticism claims that officials often do not behave in ways called for by legal 
rules, because, knowingly or unknowingly, those in power use these rules to maintain 
their particular vision of political life while quashing the political visions of those without
70 Ibid. 172.
71 Ibid. 151.
72 Ibid.
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power.74 Rules do not explain social behavior, according to CLS, but instead explain 
how the dominant control the subordinate.
Legal rules thus provide society with the distinctive political vision of those in
-re
power, and this truncated political vision stifles political action by those out of power.
The law, according to CLS, allows officials to discourage, check, and confine efforts at 
political action that would equalize power and privilege in society. The law and legal 
officials hide the political stakes from the public with legal rules, and effectively shut 
most of society out of the legal process. The idea of an independent judiciary is thus a 
fraud, in the CLS view, that places undue restraints on the political activity of those 
individuals and groups who are underrepresented in liberal legal institutions. The 
relevant population responsible for determining legal doctrine, according to CLS, is 
small, and occupied by individuals who share similar socio-economic backgrounds, and 
these individuals in power are likely to share similar subjective values.
These criticisms address two issues: first, whether or not legal decisions can be 
kept separate from political decisions, and second, whether or not politics is unfairly
* 77tilted against certain normative political visions, such as egalitarian visions. Altman 
contends that even if it is conceded that liberalism is biased against political visions such
7Ras egalitarianism, it still does not follow that the law/politics distinction is invalid.
Altman claims that as long as judges make no fresh normative assessments when
70
deciding a case, then the law/politics distinction remains valid. An individual judge
74 Ibid. 154.
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who accepts legal convention within his or her reasoning about a particular case can thus 
avoid making any fresh assessments of the merits of the conventions and values that 
underlie these legal conventions, maintaining the law/politics distinction.80 Altman 
argues that the “fit” requirements of legal reasoning ensure that decisions are based on 
the logical fit with settled law, rather than being based on grounds of the moral or
o 1
political soundness of the law. Altman concedes that political judgments sometimes 
infiltrate into legal decisions, and also concedes that liberal legal theory is biased against 
some political visions such as egalitarianism, but insists that the law/politics distinction 
holds despite these realities.
While providing a sobering account of structural indeterminacies and operational 
imperfections within any liberal system, CLS fails to convincingly show that liberalism is 
theoretically incoherent. Liberal theory is able to maintain neutrality, including the 
law/politics distinction, reasonably well under CLS scrutiny, and thus theoretical 
doctrines like legal formalism have been shown by liberals to have real teeth in practice. 
Theoretical coherence, however, is not the only measure of worth. CLS also questions 
whether or not liberal law can actual protect people from each other and the state. CLS 
doubts that liberal law can actually protect the disempowered against entrenched customs
O'}
and traditions of intolerance and oppression that can become part of liberal law. For 
example, the United States Constitution, and the liberal institutions it authorized, failed to 
protect Natives, Africans, and others from slavery, genocide, Jim Crow, and racial
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. 185.
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discrimination. These historical examples show that, within a liberal state, oppression 
may be entirely legal and backed by popular support.
Thus, it would seem that CLS is correct in asserting that liberal law is incapable, 
on its own, of protecting vulnerable people from deep seated cultural traditions of 
intolerance. Liberal laws are the construct of society and can be used against those who 
have little social power under the cloak of legality. Few contemporary liberals argue, 
however, that liberal law alone can protect the powerless in an intolerant society. In 
order for a liberal state to accomplish its political and moral aims, liberal legal rules must 
combined with social norms to reflect and support a general cultural attitude of tolerance, 
which can, in turn, check and confine undercurrents of intolerance that threaten the
O/t
modem understanding of equal liberty. As we have seen in Part II, John Rawls argues 
that tolerance, reasonableness, and a sense of fairness are the basis of consensus-based 
politics, and thus these principles must also be the normative basis of the law for the legal
Of
system to effectively protect people.
This strong sense of tolerance, although implicitly part of liberal theory, has come 
to play a greater role in the cultural attitudes of many Western, liberal societies, and has 
thus transformed the legal rules that govern these societies for the better. Within the 
United States, in particular, racial issues illustrate the disparities between the social 
aspiration of tolerance and the reality of intolerance. Americans have increasingly 
rejected ideologies of intolerance, and thus every important piece of contemporary 
American law has been shaped by a greater sense of tolerance. Desegregation laws, 
affirmative action laws, and anti-discrimination laws, for example, have all limited
84 Ibid. 199.
85 See p. 9.
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individual liberty in support of the value of racial equality. In these areas of the law, 
Americans have concluded that tolerance is best served by a greater focus on racial 
classifications. Instances of intolerance, like discrimination on the basis of race for 
housing and employment are now deemed inconsistent with American political morality, 
and have become legally prohibited. Like other contentious issues that have shaped 
American’s social and legal perspectives, capitalism verses Marxism, and the 
controversies surrounding reproductive rights, discrimination issues require a guarantee 
of certain fundamental liberties for everyone, as the first step, which can then lead to 
political compromises critical to a tolerant society.
IV. American Free Speech: A Vision of General Tolerance
Contemporary American speech doctrines contain just such a vision of tolerance 
that reflects and supports the moral consistency needed for liberal law to protect the 
politically weak from trends of social intolerance while also protecting individual liberty. 
Free speech is a well-thought-out legal strategy that preserves the benefits of this 
“different kind of liberty” while supporting the goal of equal liberty by encouraging an 
intellectual attitude of general tolerance, thus helping liberal law more effectively protect 
the politically weak/"1 The firm yet unqualified words of the first amendment - 
“Congress shall make no law.. .abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press” -  
establishes a tone of tolerance for the American principle of free speech, indicating a 
national character that values the act o f speech. Subsequent generations o f legal 
interpretation in the United States flesh out the principle of free speech with a rich set of 
legal doctrines that essentially prohibit the government from regulating the content of
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most speech in order to encourage a social and political atmosphere in which official 
practice more clearly reflects the value of general tolerance.
A. Dean Lee Bollinger’s Defense of the Principle of Free Speech 
In The Tolerant Society, Lee Bollinger justifies broad legal protections for the 
activity of speech by identifying contemporary American speech doctrine as a primary
o /  .
promoter of social tolerance. Bollinger contends that the legal protection of most 
speech content helps society internalize tolerance as a social value and reinforces the 
government’s commitment to a unique vision of liberty. For many Americans free 
speech is more than a simple slogan. Many feel that free speech and a free society are 
both ultimately privileges and responsibilities that hang precariously in the balance when 
faced with undercurrents of social intolerance. Bollinger argues that the institution of 
free speech has come to embody and symbolize the cultural, legal, and political 
aspirations of an expanded American vision of liberty, which attempts to repudiate the 
ideologies of intolerance and exclusion. This particular ideal of free speech has come to 
symbolize America’s commitment to its own unique cultural values and political goals, 
distinguishing the American ethos form those of other liberal states, which reflect 
somewhat different cultural values and political goals.
For instance, American’s have a distinctive understanding of the function of free 
speech within a tolerant society when compared with the citizens of every other liberal
87nation. No other Western democracy has a similar degree of legal protection for 
speech. Subversive, offensive, and potentially dangerous instances of speech are often
86 Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 3.
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35
legally protected from government regulation by the distinctive American principle of 
free speech.88 American citizens may lawfully advocate the overthrow of the 
government, urge others to disobey the law, speak obscenities in public, and voice a host 
of other unsavory ideas often without civil or criminal penalties. This broad legal 
protection of speech indicates that something about speech is of particularly high value 
within American political philosophy. Bollinger’s analysis seeks to illuminate the 
reasons for this uniquely permissive attitude in the realm of speech, and justify the 
principle of free speech as a complex cultural and legal strategy that fosters, rather than 
conflicts with, the value of tolerance.
The issue of intolerant speech, however, is rife with controversy and seeming 
contradiction when considered in a context of tolerant speech law. One such seeming 
contradiction, as Bollinger indicates, is the curious paradox that emerges when analyzing
89American attitudes toward social and legal responses to hate speech. Many Americans 
shrink from any suggestion to legally prohibit most types of speech while simultaneously 
advocating multiple, non-legal forms of rejection against many types of hateful speech. 
For example, should a person utter offensive racist or sexist slurs, people would probably 
demand a swift unofficial response to the speech.90 However, suggestions of criminal or 
civil penalties for the same offensive speech are generally rejected as inconsistent with 
our legal ideals. The degree to which Americans restrain themselves in advocating legal 
consequence for extreme speech is drastically different from the degree of social 
restraint.* This balance of social intolerance and legal tolerance is central to the 
operation of the principle of free speech in American life and American law.
88 Ibid.
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Although many Americans are often disdainful of speech regulation, and many 
accept the responsibilities of open discourse as part of their cultural heritage, 
contemporary American speech law recognizes several, limited exceptions in which the 
content of certain types of speech can be officially regulated. In these instances, the 
courts have found it necessary to officially regulate certain types of harmful speech that 
have been deemed unworthy of first amendment protections. Defamation laws, for 
example, regulate the content of maliciously false speech that injures someone’s 
reputation. Laws against conspiratorial speech and laws against child pornography both 
similarly regulate the content of certain types of expressions that have been deemed 
uniquely harmful and therefore beyond the limits of first amendment protection. The 
American principle of free speech has usually been interpreted broadly, but the courts 
have ruled that the harm of some types of speech and other non-speech expressions, such 
as defamation, conspiracy, and child pornography, outweigh the benefits of legal 
tolerance.
Any convincing justification for the protection of intolerant speech must address 
the problem of the harm such speech causes. Hate speech, like other types of harmful 
speech, causes difficulties for any theory of tolerance and reveals tensions found beneath 
the surface of American speech doctrines. Bollinger attempts to provide an account of 
the free speech debate that deals with the middle ground and the margins fairly to 
determine the general long-term benefits of free speech for everyone in America. One 
series of court cases, in particular, offer a glimpse into the social and legal tensions 
revealed by legally protecting hate speech, and thus occupy a prominent introductory role 
in Bollinger’s analysis of American free speech.
90 Ibid.
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B. Skokie
According to Bollinger, one important aspect of contemporary judicial 
understanding of free speech was codified by judicial decisions handed down in the 
landmark cases of the Village o f Skokie v. The National Socialist Party o f America and 
Collin v. Smith (1978).91 The final state and federal decisions rendered in these two 
series of cases offer a fairly comprehensive doctrinal overview of intolerant speech and 
first amendment precedent established over the previous five decades.92 Bollinger uses 
the Skokie affair to establish the contemporary American legal understanding of the 
principle of free speech. From this starting point, he moves into a more complex 
justification of free speech that he believes is crucial to the American vision of liberty, 
but which is not clearly present in decisions rendered in these two related series of cases.
The Skokie cases concerned the ‘right’ of a group of Nazis to march in a Chicago 
suburb with a large Jewish population.93 This obscure group, the National Socialist Party 
of America, initially requested a permit to march in front of the Skokie town hall. After 
receiving the NSPA’s request, incensed town authorities filed the initial suit in state court 
gaining an injunction against the march. Litigation continued in the Illinois state courts 
temporarily stalling the march, providing Skokie authorities the time to enact three 
ordinances covering all future marches in the town.x NSPS’s leader, Frank Collin, then 
applied for a permit to march in Skokie on another date not covered by the previous 
injunction. The permit was denied by city authorities reflecting the recently enacted 
ordinances.
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The American Civil Liberties Union then filed suit in federal district court on 
behalf of the NSPA leader, Collin, in response to Skokie’s second denial o f the permit to 
march.94 In this new federal case, Collin v. Smith, the ACLU argued that the Skokie city 
ordinances were unconstitutional under the first amendment.95 The city of Skokie later 
conceded the unconstitutionality of two of the three ordinances in reaction to the ACLU 
lawsuit filed in federal district court, yet supported one ordinance that prohibited the 
incitement of hatred “against persons by reasons of race, religion, or national origin.”96 
The city of Skokie also argued to the Illinois Supreme Court, which was the highest state 
authority to rule on the constitutionality of the original request for an injunction, that it 
had the ‘right’ to prohibit the proposed march without reference to any particular 
ordinance. Thus, the city defended the ban against the Nazi’s march in both state and
» • Q7federal court on roughly similar legal grounds.
The city of Skokie built its state and federal cases around first amendment 
exceptions, any of which, if applicable, could have justified the prohibition of the Nazi’s 
speech in front of town hall at any time. Skokie argued that the NSPA’s speech would 
constitute “fighting words,” which was declared unprotected by the Supreme Court in 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.XI The city also argued that the NSPA’s speech would 
constitute “false statements of fact,” which, like libel, remains unprotected by the first 
amendment.98 Extending this line of argument, the city called the NSPA’s speech “group 
libel” citing the case Beaharnais v. Illinois™ Skokie also argued that the NSPA’s speech
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was “obscene” and therefore unprotected." The city further argued that there was a 
“clear and present danger” of likely social harm that would come from the NSPA’s 
speech, and that such speech was the psychological equivalent of a physical assault.100 
Lastly, the city argued that they were not attempting to prohibit speech content, but were 
only regulating the “time, place, and manner” of the speech, which is held to a less 
stringent form of first amendment review.101
The Illinois State Supreme Court and the United States District Court both 
ultimately rejected each of these claims for the same reasons, ending both the state and 
federal cases initially filed on behalf of the town of Skokie and NSPA leader Frank 
Collin, respectively. The doctrine established in Chaplinsky only applied to face-to- 
face encounters, both state and federal courts determined, and thus the city’s “fighting 
words” argument was rejected.103 The NSPA’s speech, however revolting, was 
considered by both courts to be political speech, and could be avoided by not showing up 
at the march.104 The argument of “libel” was similarly rejected on the basis that the 
speech did not constitute factual assertions, but instead constituted perverse political 
ideas, which, in principle, could not be considered as true or untrue by the courts.105 The 
“group libel” precedent established in Beauharnais was distinguishable from Skokie in 
that it applied to instances where violence was likely to erupt from the speech, and the 
city had by the time of these two final rulings withdrawn the claim that the city was likely
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to respond to the march with violence.106 The Nazis’ speech could not be considered as 
“obscene” since it lacked erotic content. The “clear and present danger” argument was 
invalid in both state and federal cases as it was deemed unlikely that anyone who heard 
the Nazi’s speech would be immediately persuaded to take part in unlawful behavior.107 
Finally, the city’s claim that its restrictions regulated only the “time, place, and manner” 
of the NSPA’s speech went afoul of the firm distinction between regulations meant to 
limit speech in the pursuit of other concerns and those that seek to limit speech because 
of content.108 Both the Illinois State Supreme Court and the federal court ruled that the 
city of Skokie sought to limit speech because of its offensive content, and, therefore, the 
lower court’s injunction and the city’s ordinances were unconstitutional.
Both the federal and state courts’ justifications were based, in part, on their 
inability to draw a clear line that would eliminate the NSPA’s speech without in some 
way endangering the broad function of speech within American society.109 The courts 
believed that banning the NSPA’s speech would jeopardize the structure of free speech 
doctrines and traditions that had been erected over the last two generations. Both state 
and federal courts acknowledged the offensive nature of the NSPA’s speech, however, 
due to clear first amendment precedent, neither case was fundamentally about the 
uniquely offensive and potentially harmful ideas of Nazi propaganda. Both cases were 
instead about the city of Skokie’s choice o f restrictions.110
In both cases, the burden was on the town of Skokie to prove its ordinance to be 
within well-established first amendment guidelines. Following clear precedent, both
106 Ibid. 33.
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courts rejected Skokie’s arguments and protected the speech, reflecting the ideal of 
tolerant speech law. The Skokie cases attracted much attention and were surrounded by 
social and political controversy; however, they were not considered as ‘hard cases’ by 
legal liberals. The Skokie ordinance, although well intentioned, was an attempt to silence 
the distasteful ideas of a loathed ideological minority and was, therefore, an abuse of 
official power under settled law.
The courts’ decisions explained why Skokie’s arguments lacked adequate 
justification, but avoided any explicit affirmative justifications of the doctrines leading to 
the result. Thus, Bollinger’s analysis seeks to provide a more general justification of 
speech doctrines by describing the distinctive vision of tolerance found within American 
speech law. Accordingly, Bollinger moves from the doctrinal details of the free speech 
debate exemplified by Skokie, and provides two complementary justifications that 
underwrite what Americans say about the aims and goals of free speech: what he calls the 
classical and fortress models.111
Classical arguments embody liberalism’s faith in the reason of average citizens, 
while fortress arguments embody liberal anxiety about official power. Each model, in its 
own way, attempts to portray well protected speech activity as a positive exercise with 
broad social, political, and legal benefits. Bollinger’s arguments draw together what he 
believes to be the relevant elements of free speech tradition as it has come to play a new 
and expanded role in twentieth century American life. By analyzing what free speech has 
meant in the past, and describing what free speech doctrine has come to mean today,
110 Ibid.
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Bollinger’s two models identify the values Americans protect with contemporary free 
speech doctrine.
Although both models recognize the appeal of free speech within the liberal 
tradition, neither model can, alone, justify the extent of free speech protection in 
American jurisprudence. The tendency of classical liberal arguments, according to 
Bollinger, to abstract from real-life and avoid discussing particular instances of extreme 
speech, like racist hate speech, leaves them open to criticisms of naivete and idealism.112 
Fortress model arguments are, to the contrary, more realistic about social realities and 
address the real harm of extreme speech, but these arguments are sometimes accused by 
critics of misrepresenting the history, language, and precedent of the first amendment. 
Both classical and fortress models analyze the underlying principles people defend when 
asked about free speech, and, despite their individual limitations, both arguments provide 
familiar justifications for free speech doctrine.
C. Classical Model
Classical free speech arguments, according to Bollinger, were initially formulated 
during the intellectual revolution of the Enlightenment, when confidence in human reason 
and skepticism of absolute power flourished, and when the way people envisioned 
relationships between the individual, society, and the state was reconceived.114 Classical 
arguments subscribe to two fundamental liberal premises concerning these relationships: 
first, the state possesses limited political power derived from the citizenry, and second, 
society is competent collectively to determine its own destiny through self­
112 Ibid. 104-105.
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government.115 These classical liberal arguments have had strong appeal in the United 
States. From these premises concerning balanced state and social relationships arose the 
American Revolution, and the structure of government outlined in the oldest working, 
and most often copied, liberal constitution. For instance, colonial experiences with 
restrictive speech laws of the British monarchy, such as prior restraint, led to the 
embedding of certain principles into free speech doctrine, such as the rejection of prior 
restraint. As American political life moved from colonial to revolutionary to republican, 
the toleration of inflammatory speech became an integral part of that process.116 To some 
degree, free speech and American political life are inextricably linked by history and 
tradition. Although it is impossible to know the exact original intent of the first 
amendment, classical arguments attempt to identify the liberal values supported by 
tolerant speech law, values which are themselves part of American history and tradition.
While the founding documents leave an indelible mark on way Americans 
envision political life, in order for any rule to govern disputes now and in the future, 
people must know the specific purposes behind that rule.117 Bollinger’s classical model 
seeks to describe the network of interrelated liberal goals and values at the core of 
American speech doctrine. At different times and under different circumstances, free 
expression has been justified by referencing other primary values associated with the 
activity of speech, like the search for truth, the pursuit of the good-life, the maintenance 
o f democratic self-government, and general tolerance. Bollinger’s classical model 
identifies the benefits of these values and describes how these and other liberal values
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have come to underwrite a relatively consistent, well-founded body of speech law. For 
Bollinger, free speech has come to symbolize a unique form of social organization, and 
speech doctrine has come to protect this American vision of political life, and thus free 
speech implies more than the protection of speech.
Classical justifications of free speech often cite the acquisition of “truth” as one
118 • • * • •primary value. To explore the positive benefits of this truth seeking value, Bollinger
borrows claims from John Stuart Mill’s liberal treatise, On Liberty, as an instance of the 
argument that the toleration o f error is critical to identifying truth.119 The legal toleration 
and social confrontation of error, according to Mill’s arguments, untangles webs of deceit 
and fortifies truth with the exposure of error. Mill contends that the truth is sometimes 
incomplete without the corollary of error, and society must endure error at times to 
discover more compelling truths. Free speech, he argues, intensifies the light of truth in
1 AA
response to error, exposing a livelier notion of truth. Mill argues that silencing error 
has the effect of pushing truth towards dogma, and this denies a fuller conception of what 
the truth is, or what may become true through investigation/"1
In sum, Mill’s classical, truth seeking arguments justify tolerance in the area of 
 ̂ speech on three grounds. First, any opinion silenced by intolerant regulations may in fact 
be a truth we currently do not identify. Second, the silenced opinion may be mostly false, 
but partially true. Third, even if an opinion is completely false, in silencing it, society 
and its institutions assume infallibility on the given issue and become dogmatic and 
potentially oppressive. Thus, Mill’s arguments recognize that truth is always unfinished,
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tentative, and subject to new data, experience, and arguments that can only be fully 
appreciated by tolerating error.121
Mill’s arguments imply that within the social context of pluralism and the 
political context of liberalism, basic protections for the fundamental liberty of speech are 
critical to the associated value of seeking the truth; and, in effect, basic protections for 
speech help create a social atmosphere in which to explore the value of tolerance for 
alternative ideas and life-styles. Thus, Mill believed that the greatest harm of intolerant 
speech restrictions is not done to the ignorant who express erroneous ideas, but rather the 
greatest harm is done by creating an atmosphere of intolerance that causes everyone else
i 'j/yto be afraid of being wrong. Intolerant speech regulations infringe on the thought
process of citizens and diminish the fundamental value of liberty for everyone. Mill 
argues that protection against blatant political tyranny in the area o f speech is insufficient 
to protect the activity of speech against intolerant social attitudes. For free speech to 
survive intolerant social impulses, it must also be protected from the tyranny of the 
majority, which could use the democratic process to silence error. Mill’s arguments 
suggest that strict legal protections for the activity of speech help to foster the intellectual 
attitude necessary to maintain this fundamental liberty o f conscience, and, in turn, this 
supports the principle of general tolerance within society.
Although part of a different historical context, Mill’s “truth seeking” arguments 
have helped to form the conceptual basis for contemporary speech doctrine as it began to
193be reconceived by judges in the early twentieth century. Oliver Wendell Holms 
majority opinion in Schenck v. United States and his dissenting opinion in Abrams v.
121 Ebenstein, Great Political Thinkers, 543.
122 Ibid. 544.
46
United States highlight this change injudicial philosophy regarding the function of 
speech doctrine. In both cases, the Supreme Court upheld the prosecution of individuals 
disseminating communist literature under the Espionage Act.124 In Schenck, Holmes 
voted to convict the leader of the American Socialist Party on the grounds that the 
content of his speech, within the context of a world war, created a “clear and present
i  •y c
danger” that Congress has a right to prevent. For Holmes, Schenck was a “question of 
proximity and degree.”126 War and revolution raged overseas and some speech seemed 
particularly threatening at home. The Schenck decision focused on the harm of the 
political message in question, rather than focusing on the more pervasive harm of this 
type of speech regulation.
A few years later in Abrams, however, Holmes dissented on the conviction of 
Russian aliens disseminating similar literature on the grounds that speech rights outweigh 
the harms of particular political messages, even with consideration to the temporal 
circumstance of world war and domestic discontent. Holmes had come to believe that the 
harm of this type of political speech was less of a threat to American values in the long­
term than was this type of speech prohibition. Free speech, Holmes now believed, must 
be protected as a constitutional principle, even during difficult times, for the long term
177health of the “market place of ideas,” and the free consciences that compete there.
Prosecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you 
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all 
your heart, you naturally express your wishes in the law and sweep away all 
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the 
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do
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not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or 
your premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting 
faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations 
of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade 
in ideas -  that the best test of truth is the power o f the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon
which their wishes safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our
128constitution.
Holmes believed he had been incorrect in the earlier Schenck decision, and he was 
attempting to voice his new-found understanding of the free speech ideal, basing his 
dissent on principle rather than social and political pressures. Holmes identifies the 
regime of censorship being imposed against communists as logical and predictable, but 
shortsighted, and, ultimately, counterproductive. Rather than evaluating the minds of 
the malcontents who test the limits of speech rights, Holmes’ dissent concentrated on the 
state of mind present within a society that desires to silence ignorant, offensive, and 
unheralded acts of speech.130 In this way, Holmes was less moved by an urge for truth
l i t
than he was by a perceived social deficiency -  intolerance toward speech.
According to Bollinger, Holmes considered the censorship involved in Abrams as 
a form of communication, a form of speech, and his dissenting opinion seeks to counter 
its theme of intolerance and, instead, promote an intellectual attitude of tolerance that he
1 ^7now believed was at the core of the first amendment. With the gaining acceptance of 
this expanded vision of free speech, Holmes’ dissent in Abrams stood as the central 
organizing vision of the principle of free speech that developed over the next five
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1decades, leading, ultimately, to Skokie. Holmes’ dissent erected a new conceptual 
shelter for free speech, and the decisions o f later cases made his earlier dissent the law. 
The Holmes’ model essentially prohibits legal interference with speech activity, unless it 
can be shown that an immediate, profound harm will ensue from the speech -  the “clear 
and present danger” test.134 This new judicial focus indicates a shift in the free speech 
perspective, and is, in Bollinger’s opinion, Holmes’ primary legal innovation in the area 
of speech doctrine.
Holmes’ arguments in favor of tolerance in the area of speech are, however, 
according to Bollinger, unacceptably limited.135 Tolerance in the area of speech is more 
complex than Holmes’ arguments indicate, and, according to Bollinger, the relativism 
and self-doubt of Holmes’ writings about free speech detract from the force of his legal 
arguments.136 Holmes’ writings reflect an early, underdeveloped vision of the broader 
function of free speech within the American polity. The Court needed time and 
experience to articulate other positive justifications for broadly protecting speech. With 
the help o f Holmes’ shift in perspective, though, free speech doctrine had come to set the 
social, legal, and political agenda of tolerance. The Court has repeatedly affirmed this 
new and expanded role of speech doctrine through its decisions subsequent to Abrams.
For instance, since Abrams, political goals have become more prominent within 
free speech doctrine. The Supreme Court articulated many features of this modem first 
amendment doctrine by closely linking free speech and self-government in Sullivan v.
133
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New York Times.131 The Sullivan case concerns state defamation laws applied to false 
statements made about public figures.138 The Court recognized the link between 
common law defamation rules and defunct arguments of seditious libel, and determined 
that some otherwise defamatory statements about public officials must be protected, 
absent reckless disregard for the truth, to maintain “uninhibited, robust, and wide open” 
political speech.139 In Sullivan, the Court stated this additional, affirmative justification 
for free speech that was only found between the lines in Holmes’ Abrams dissent.
Classical liberal “self-government” arguments, some of which were affirmed in 
decisions like Sullivan, are important to this analysis, but they cannot alone justify the 
United States’ principle of free speech. Some critics argue that linking the principle of 
free speech and self-government too closely misrepresents the realities of democratic 
political life. Some critics of the American principle of free speech insist that it is 
undemocratic to deny the possibility of further restrictions on speech. Liberal theory 
does not specifically stipulate the principle of free speech as it is currently understood in 
American jurisprudence, and many democratic nations survive with different, more
s
restrictive, laws that govern speech. Free societies, such as the United Kingdom, have 
taken legislative steps to restrict certain types of hate speech, and remain, to a degree, 
free societies.
As a society, however, Americans have decided that the principle of free speech is 
an integral part of their unique vision of liberalism. Other free societies’ visions of 
speech were developed under different circumstances and often reject the distinctive 
features of American social, legal, and political life served by the principle of free
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speech. The degree to which democracy and free speech are linked is relative to the 
society being discussed, but the nexus between the two in American life was clear to 
Justice Holmes, and was clear to the judges who decided Sullivan and Skokie. Thus, it is 
neither a misunderstanding nor misrepresentation to assert that the exceptionally strong 
principle of free speech is a vital component of the American democratic tradition. 
Americans could democratically transform the meaning of the principle of free speech 
and remain a democracy, but it would detract from the distinctive vision of liberty that is 
now ingrained in American social and political life. Thus, free speech and the character 
of contemporary American constitutional democracy are inextricably linked.
Some criticisms of classical liberal free speech arguments, however, suggest 
internal theoretical weaknesses. The classical tendency to abstract and idealize aspects of 
the human condition draws relevant criticism to these arguments. For instance, in real 
life instances of hate speech, like the proposed Nazi speech defended in Skokie, there was 
little possibility that any truths would be revealed or affirmed, nor was there any 
indication that the Skokie ordinance by itself would bring down democratic institutions, 
which seems to undercut the values so prominent in the classical model. Some critics 
argue that if  government is unable to identify truth, then certainly it can identify the 
errors of the most offensive creeds, and address these issues through official channels for 
the protection of targeted individuals and groups. Holmes’ insight that identifies speech 
doctrine as “agenda setting” shows the power of speech, but Holmes, Mill, and other 
liberals, according to some critics, incorrectly dismiss the potential harms of the most 
malignant forms of extreme speech. Real-life instances of hate, like in Skokie, reveal the
139 Ibid.
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real harm of some speech, and this real harm, critics argue, seems too often ignored by 
classical justifications of free speech.
D. Fortress Model
Bollinger offers his “fortress model” arguments to address the reality of social 
intolerance and to highlight the legal difficulties associated with the regulation of hateful 
and offensive speech. The fortress model agrees with and shares the core goals of the 
classical model; valuing the broad legal toleration of speech content to restrict 
government authority and protect individual autonomy and self-government.140 This 
model, however, departs from the optimism of the classical model by rejecting the notion 
that all speech content is relevant to the search for social truths, and adds a more 
pessimistic vision of the state and society.141 Fortress arguments make free speech also a 
barrier between state power and social freedom rather than only a diviner of truth.142 
Fortress model arguments describe a legal strategy that protects the goals of the classical 
model, but also proposes a social strategy that supports an intellectual attitude of 
tolerance in the area of speech. Fortress model arguments reflect the notion that speech 
content prohibitions are taboo, and should not even be considered by a fickle public, or a 
greedy government, for fear of an irreversible loss of liberty.
This argument demands that the judiciary strike down legislation that narrows the 
broad limits of the free speech. Without an uncompromisable judicial understanding of 
the boundaries of free speech, this model tells us, intolerant people will erode liberty
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through the misuse of government powers in the area of speech. Thus, strict limits must 
be placed on even the possibility o f governmental speech regulations to safeguard the 
public from a self-imposed authoritarian rule. Fortress arguments, as the name implies, 
essentially place free speech law in a locked box (a fortress) of strict doctrine that 
circumscribes the power of the judiciary over certain types of speech regulation. These 
arguments attempt to enlarge the legal understanding of the free speech principle to 
protect society from certain intolerant tendencies that lead to the natural desire to silence 
perceived human error through the use of state power.143
Liberal theory developed as a response to traditions of intolerance and oppression, 
and fortress arguments are thus consistent with liberalism’s wariness of intolerance 
magnified by official power. America’s contemporary interpretation of the principle of 
free speech reflects this cautious stance. In the past, the principle has lacked the current 
broad legal protection for speech, and has also been misapplied more recently during 
times of crisis. Many instances of intolerant speech policies were often crafted in order 
to silence the “dangerous” speech of perceived political enemies with the support of the 
general public. American’s legal response to intolerance forms the historical basis for 
fortress arguments, arguments which seek to counter intolerant social impulses by 
strengthening the principle of tolerance in speech law.
Feelings of crisis similar to those expressed by Holmes in Schenck surfaced again 
in America during the cold war, and the relatively new limits of speech regulation were 
again tested by fears of communist ideology. American fear of communism as a political 
and military force came to a peak during the nuclear standoff and perceived missile gap
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of the fifties. Senator Joseph McCarthy is the most recognizable government personality 
of the Red Scare era, and his name has become synonymous with oppression. However, 
if one were truly committed to a republican, capitalistic form of government, then the 
fears of the McCarthy era were real - communism seemed to be flourishing domestically 
and internationally - but the reaction to the perceived threat was misdirected, and - 
jeopardized the core liberal goals of speech doctrine supposedly being defended in the 
hearings.xlv Much like the misuse of Espionage Act at issue in Abrams, the McCarthy era 
hearings ignored American ideals of tolerance and undercut the function of free speech 
by attempting to regulate the ideas, expressions, and associations of citizens based simply 
on their adherence to what seemed to be a dangerous political ideology.
Bollinger’s fortress arguments assume that when faced with real or perceived 
threats from unheralded, even potentially dangerous groups, like communist 
revolutionaries and Nazis, the public’s fear will incite the government into devising 
speech regulations that will inevitably jeopardize everyone’s liberty by jeopardizing their 
free speech. Americans attempted to repel communist ideology by generally hating 
communists, and magnified this hatred by criminalizing their political speech. The 
McCarthy era hearings remind Americans that the state is an enormous system with the 
power and resources to silence unwanted messages. Allowing the government to deviate 
from the principle of tolerance in the area of speech could begin to allow regulation that 
not only forbids speech perceived to be extreme or dangerous, but, more importantly, 
intolerant speech doctrine threatens valuable expression in the center.144 The official 
repression of controversial ideologies sets a bad precedent for society’s general response
144 Ibid. 83.
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to dissent, thereby jeopardizing liberal values by trampling the liberties of conscience of
any citizen who defies convention.
Despite the lapse in tolerance toward speech and association exemplified by the
McCarthy era, the perceived benefits of general tolerance in the face of dissent were
again expressed by the Court in Cohen v. California. In the Vietnam War era Cohen
case, the Court decided that California could not prohibit, on the grounds of its
offensiveness, a person from wearing in public a garment inscribed with the words: Fuck
the Draft.145 In this decision, Justice John Harlan discussed his vision of the expanded
role of free speech in American life.
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as 
diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove 
governmental restraints from the arena o f public discussion, putting the decision 
of what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each of us, in the hope that 
use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more capable citizenry and more 
perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would comport with the 
premises of individual dignity and choice upon which our political system rests.146
The ability to express an offensive idea without official sanction, according to 
Harlan, is an intrinsically positive exercise with benefits that go beyond this instance of 
speech. Within a pluralist society, as Harlan explains, free speech produces not only a 
more informed citizenry, but also a more capable citizenry. Harlan suggests that tolerant
• 147speech doctrine creates within people certain capacities that are otherwise lacking.
The process of defending one’s views instills individuals with a greater capacity to deal 
with the contrary beliefs of others and, thus, encourages a greater tolerance. In this 
expanded, more modem interpretation of speech law, the value of tolerance is viewed
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broadly as an education that ultimately touches all aspects of American’s lives. Although 
dismissive of Cohen’s offensive choice of words, word choice was not the central issue 
for Harlan. Like the Skokie cases, the central issue in Cohen was whether or not this type 
of speech prohibition undercut the more expansive goals of free speech to encourage 
general tolerance.xv Allowing the state to prohibit “indecent speech,” Harlan argued, 
“would effectively empower a majority to silence dissent simply as a matter o f personal 
predilections.”148 Harlan believed that such prohibitions would set a bad precedent for 
society’s response to dissenting ideas, and, ultimately, encourage the intellectual attitude 
of intolerance.
According to Bollinger, like Justice Holmes’ transformative vision of free speech 
expressed in Abrams, Harlan’s vision of free speech finds its antecedent in Mill’s 
argument that a “livelier” version of the truth comes with the existence of error.149 In 
addition to the “truth seeking” value described by Mill’s arguments, though, Holmes and 
Harlan focus more carefully on the value of general tolerance. The value of tolerance in 
speech doctrine was more important to Holmes and Harlan than the truth-value of speech 
at issue in Abrams and Cohen. Both Holmes’ and Harlan’s visions of free speech 
indicate that tolerant speech law provides society with broad benefits, while overzealous 
regulations for incorrect and offensive ideas detract from the atmosphere of general 
tolerance and upset the balance of values that underwrite American political life.
However, despite the specific history of the first amendment, according to 
Bollinger, the central focus of the fortress model is less about the force of precedent and 
principle, and is, instead, a political strategy in response to a perception of intolerance
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and bias by the politically powerful against the politically weak.150 The fortress model 
thus seeks more than a legal outcome. It attempts to instill an attitude of tolerance 
through the protection of intolerant speech. The fortress model seeks the benefits of 
speech activity, identified in the classical model, but also attempts to erect a fortress 
around speech activity that Americans will be unable to breach during times of public 
crisis.151
As we have now seen through Bollinger’s analysis, freedom of speech serves a 
larger function within American society than simply licensing individual choices against 
official power. It also creates a protective zone in which society can develop and test 
intellectual attitudes, and where assumptions about undesirable intellectual traits can be 
offered and remedies proffered -  what may be considered as exploring the value of 
general tolerance.152 Bollinger claims that this broader function of free speech forces a 
different look at Isaiah Berlin’s two concepts of liberty.xvl Bollinger contends that while 
free speech creates a negative zone of liberty for the individual, limiting government 
efforts to regulate intolerant ideas, it also provides an atmosphere in which society can 
identify, confront, and discourage intolerant ideas, and, thus, strives for a zone of positive 
liberty -  an atmosphere o f general tolerance. In this sense, Bollinger argues, tolerance in 
the area of speech links negative and positive concepts of liberty by allowing the 
existence of intolerant ideas, and then providing the positive means to defeat those 
ideas.153
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Speech covers the depth and breadth of American life, and stands, according to 
Bollinger, as the symbolic gateway to contemporary social intercourse.154 Many 
Americans have genuine fear of most types of speech restrictions and genuine faith in the 
contemporary regime of free speech. Religious, ethnic, political, and philosophical 
tolerance is supported by the American system, in part, due to the principle of free 
speech. As a society, Americans have decided to legally tolerate the offensive, often 
intolerant, expressions of Nazis and communists, and, in doing so, they powerfully reject 
the intolerant ideologies that seek to undermine America’s unique vision of liberty. 
Bollinger concedes that the broad limits of free speech doctrine are, at times, used by the 
enemies of liberty, whose freedoms are protected by this doctrine.155 In order to better 
preserve freedom for everyone, however, it is necessary to protect certain rights for those 
who may deserve them less. Fortress arguments recognize that society is sometimes put 
in the awkward position of indirectly defending the hateful, even the potentially 
dangerous, to maintain America’s commitment to tolerance.
Bollinger and other liberals recognize that, within a free society, tolerant people 
will at times be confronted with the reality of dangerous and intolerant people. The 
question then arises: at what point does a person’s intolerance of others warrant limiting 
that person’s liberties? Justice does not require citizens to stand by while others destroy 
the basis of their existence. The right of self-protection, John Rawls argues in A Theory 
of Justice, would require tolerant people within a liberal society to limit the intolerance of 
others when there is a danger that equal liberties are threatened.156 Given the existence of
154 Ibid. 238.
155 Ibid. 101.
156 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Fourth Edition Reprint, 
Cambridge: Belnap Press, 2001), 192.
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intolerant groups who are politically inflexible and would subvert the ideals of liberalism 
if  allowed, the extent of liberties enjoyed by these intolerant people is of vital importance 
for the maintenance of order and security.
Rawls argues that all citizens of a liberal democracy have a responsibility to 
uphold a just constitution that furthers liberal values, and are not necessarily relieved of 
this obligation whenever others are intolerant.157 When dealing with social intolerance 
through coercive measures of the state, there must be considerable danger to the over-all 
constitutional structure. Should an intolerant social sect arise that respects the basic 
political moralities of a state’s just constitution, Rawls argues, then the state has no right 
to limit any members of that sects individual liberty. A more stringent condition is 
required.159 To limit any citizen’s freedoms of conscience, the actions of the intolerant 
must be recognized as a special case that warrants the use of state power for preserving 
liberty itself. In other instances of intolerance, when people are negatively impacted but 
liberty itself is unthreatened, other unofficial social forces are capable of dealing with the 
intolerant.160 Thus, Rawls’ answer to the problem of intolerance and liberty is, then, that 
while the intolerant may have little reason to complain of social intolerance toward his or 
her thoughts and actions, certain freedoms of conscience should only be restricted when 
the tolerant have good reason to believe that liberal institutions are themselves in 
danger.161 This is not to suggest, however, that society should coddle murderers, Nazis, 
or communist revolutionaries when they defy the rules of social order and security. 
Everyone is bound by these kinds of limiting principles.
157 Ibid.
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Some critics charge that the fortress model’s concerns about social intolerance 
and state over-reaction put these arguments at odds with the optimism of the classical 
model.162 If inherently intolerant people are not to be trusted with deciding speech rights 
through the democratic process, then why allow unelected judges to protect speech rights 
that may be undeserved? Rather than contradict the optimism of classical arguments, 
though, the fortress argument’s concerns are complementary. Fortress arguments do 
place a greater emphasis on liberal anxieties about the possible misuse of state power 
over liberal hopes of a reasonable citizenry. A fear of social intolerance and government 
power, however, is a reasonable fear. Fortress arguments, in effect, offer a justification 
for the principle of free speech for a tolerant, reasonable society that may have intolerant 
tendencies.
Other critics argue that it is impossible to know whether or not the Framers 
intended the current level of speech protection. Some pre-and early American legal 
writings suggest that the Framers intended something different from current free speech 
doctrine. Interpretations of original intent vary among legal scholars, but, whatever may 
be the case at the origins, it is clear that the level of speech actually protected by the first 
amendment has developed and changed over the generations.xvn It is also clear, however, 
that the enlargement of speech rights in the twentieth century did not happen in a 
historical vacuum, nor is it void of historical underpinnings. The phrase “We the people” 
in the preamble to the Constitution meant something different in 1787 than it did in 
succeeding generations. As individuals and groups fought to be included in the phrase 
“We the people” the Constitutional language of the first amendment, the historical legacy
161 Ibid. 193.
162 Bollinger, A Tolerant Society, 80.
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of tolerance, and the fresh moral insight in the legal reasoning of conscientious judges all 
allowed free speech and political inclusion to complement one another. Analogously, the 
“non-establishment clause” of the first amendment has come mean more than the original 
wording of the Constitution would seem to specify. Nowhere does the Constitution set 
forth legal requirements that a “wall” separates church and state, although the “non­
establishment clause” has been interpreted to mean that such a wall does indeed exist. To 
some degree, though, the notion that church and state are separate has always been part of 
American political heritage.
The American Constitution is brief and much of the language is open-ended and 
abstract. This permits the overlapping social consensus to subtly adjust, by 
interpretation, the application of certain core principles, like free speech and religious 
tolerance, as long as the over-all structure and purpose of liberal government remain 
protected. The general ideals of the principle of free speech have remained embedded 
within American law, but it took time and experience to realize the extent to which the 
ideal of speech tolerance supports other liberal goals so critical to American life. 
Moreover, few free speech advocates deny the need for exceptions in speech law.
Fortress arguments simply suggest limiting the number and scope of these exceptions as
i  / ' • j
much as is reasonable to minimize the chance for misuse. Exceptions must be few and 
tightly controlled to avoid falling back down the “slippery slope,” which had allowed the 
persecution of political dissidents, civil rights activist, labor activists, and the like due to 
the controversial content of their speech.
The Skokie decisions were based on this rationale. In Skokie, the various courts 
acknowledged the validity o f first amendment exceptions, but they refused to expand
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these exceptions to fit the particulars of these cases. Since Abrams, the courts have 
generally protected the structure of free speech doctrine erected by Holmes’ dissenting 
opinion in order to avoid this slippery slope of intolerant speech restrictions. American 
society has now formed a well-articulated and well-founded agreement about the limits of 
government power regarding speech, and the fortress model’s arguments reflect this 
consensus. And, although admitting exceptions, this consensus stipulates certain kinds of 
speech regulations should remain absent from the legal and political bargaining table, 
bracketed, so to speak.164
When rights as vulnerable and important as speech rights have been secured, 
fortress arguments tell us, they must be fortified within the structure of government 
itself.165 Fortress arguments further the notion that an institution within the government 
structure, the judiciary, must be charged with the task of guarding free speech against the 
excesses of the political branches.166 Fortress arguments are more than a political 
strategy protecting the values of the classical model, though. Fortress arguments directly 
and affirmatively further the value of general tolerance.
In sum, classical arguments recognize that a liberal system of government 
provides the best possibility for a tolerant, well-ordered-society, and fortress arguments 
recognize that any system of government provides a possibility for oppressive, intolerant 
policies that could eventually undermine liberal ideals. Bollinger thus envisions 
contemporary American speech doctrines as part of a social ethic and not simply as a 
means of limiting government intervention in the realm of speech. Bollinger’s model
163 Ibid. 95.
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arguments, together, provide a specific vision o f free speech, which fits within the 
general framework of liberal theory. This vision of free speech, however, is not the only 
vision that fits within the liberal tradition, and many liberals (e.g., in Canada) reject his 
specific vision. Even within the American liberal tradition, many liberals disagree over 
the acceptable limits of free speech.
V. An Alternative Vision of Speech Doctrine
As we saw in Part III, many moderate Critical Legal Studies critics agree with 
liberals like Altman that the law is a practical necessity of modem life. Many of these 
critics, though, still doubt whether or not speech law is doing all that it ought to do, or 
could do, to protect minorities from intolerance. Some in the moderate wing of CLS 
would agree that the law reflects and maintains distinctive patterns of thinking and action 
that regulate human activity, but they charge that minority groups are often oppressed by 
the cultures in which they live, and are, thus, ill-served by many social institutions, 
including certain aspects of the American institution of free speech. According to these 
critics, claims of legal neutrality and tolerance can allow the majority to oppress 
minorities under the cover of law.
Critical Race Theory, a moderate subset of CLS, seeks to identify the implicit and 
explicit racism of the American legal system to justify non-neutral legal strategies that 
focus on combating racial oppression through official channels. By utilizing alternative 
methods and standards, these critics believe that it is possible to show how American 
speech law can be other wise than it is currently, and thus better reflect their particular
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vision of racial equality. Many of these CRT critics have moved beyond general, race- 
neutral CLS criticisms of liberal law, and have made proposals for changes in legal 
doctrine that would, they believe, help combat the immediate effects of racism in the 
everyday lives o f racial minorities, and thereby help to defeat the ubiquitous forces of 
racial oppression entrenched in American society and reflected in its laws.
V.A. Professor Mari J. Matsuda’s Deconstructive Analysis of Free Speech and 
Her Constructive Legal Proposal of Limited Intolerance
In her article, Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story, 
Mary J. Matsuda offers one such proposal.167 Matsuda recognizes the limitations of 
liberal theory pointed out by moderate CLS criticisms, and, as a Critical Race Theorist, 
she is interested in exploiting those limitations to change speech law to better reflect her 
vision of racial equality and thus combat the effects of racism through official legal 
channels. Matsuda does not seek to expose the rule of law as a “myth,” as radical CLS 
theorists have claimed, but, instead, she seeks to expose the patina o f liberal neutrality 
and its claims of tolerance, which she believes actually support aspects o f racial 
hierarchy. Matsuda, thus, utilizes moderate, deconstructive CLS arguments, and, then, 
proposes her own constructive model o f speech doctrine based on an alternative vision of 
speech doctrine found in international precedent and existing American speech law 
exceptions. Matsuda believes that a new, narrow exception for certain types of hate 
speech would improve the structure of American speech doctrine, without seriously 
undermining the core liberal values of the first amendment. Matsuda’s article thus rejects
167 Matsuda “Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 1.
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the “slippery slope” arguments of Bollinger’s fortress model and attempts to draw legal 
lines that the judges in Skokie did not draw.
Matsuda’s vision of American life is centered on race relations characterized by 
the social dominance of one group and the subordination of others. As she sees it, 
majority on minority racism typifies the American social structure of dominance and 
subordination, and this power relation is reflected in the structural realities of American 
institutions such as the law.xvm Justifications for the principle of free speech presented by 
liberals like Bollinger are legally contingent, Matsuda argues, and, in her view, they 
inadvertently perpetuate racism by obscuring the effect of free speech doctrines on racial 
minorities. Liberal claims of tolerance, neutrality, and individual liberty become tools of 
power within a context of dominance and subordination, according to Matsuda. Thus, by 
asserting these liberal principles and ignoring the direct harms of racist speech to 
minorities, Matsuda charges, non-minority liberals miss the extent of racism in speech 
law and consequently increase the harm of racist speech for minority communities.
Laws against libel, defamation, conspiratorial speech, and other notable free 
speech exceptions, all show that certain types of harmful speech are qualitatively 
different from valuable types o f speech that receive first amendment protections.
Matsuda believes that not creating a new, sui generis category for racist speech, based on 
the analogy between these existing exceptions and harmful hate speech, reveals the 
implicit bias and insensitivity o f the American system toward the experiences of 
minorities. Matsuda contends that the protection of some types of racist speech is, thus, 
selective application of the principles of free speech law that ignores the special status of 
some minorities and the harms of some types of racist speech. This reality, Matsuda
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contends, puts minorities in a position of being twice harmed; first from racist verbal 
attacks, and, then, from the legal toleration of this type of speech.
Finding no redress with the state, victims of racist speech are further marginalized 
socially, politically, and legally while overt and covert forms of racism remain legally 
protected, and thereby remain entrenched in American life. The tolerance of racist 
speech, Matsuda contends, is not an evenly distributed social burden, but, rather, 
minorities experience it more harshly. The special protection allowed to children and the 
public/private distinctions in speech doctrine are both illustrative exceptions for Matsuda. 
Both of these exceptions show that speech law can and does provide additional legal 
protections for those who are at a disadvantage, and who may be harmed more by 
allowing certain types of speech than by prohibiting it. If American law permitted the 
dissemination of child pornography, the argument goes, then it would be a tacit 
endorsement of the exploitation of children. Thus, these and other free speech exceptions 
based on the harm of the speech lead Matsuda to believe that a new, narrow category 
could be created within speech law to better protect racial minorities without seriously 
undermining the core values of the first amendment. There are no inevitable results in 
the law, as CLS argues, especially at the margins. By exploiting the indeterminateness at 
the margins, Matsuda suggests, American law could combat certain types of racist speech 
while maintaining the core ideals of the first amendment for the victims of racism.
Matsuda thus acknowledges, in general, the value of many core political 
principles defended by Rawls and Bollinger, such as individual autonomy, and self- 
government. She rejects, however, what she believes to be the overextension of these 
liberal values in specific instances of speech law. By choosing the values of individual
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liberty, self-government, truth-seeking, and general tolerance, over the value of racial 
sensitivity, in the context of hate speech, Matsuda argues, the dominant class harms 
minority groups by simply ignoring their collective perspectives and experiences. Thus, 
although Matsuda and Bollinger share the goals of combating racism and protecting 
society from the misuse of speech law, they disagree over how liberal values are best 
balanced and implemented in the context of American speech law to accomplish these 
goals. For Bollinger, the tolerance principle, which allows the existence of intolerant 
ideologies, defeats those ideologies by establishing a social ethic of tolerance in one area 
of social life that carries over into other areas o f social life. For Matsuda, the tolerance 
principle helps perpetuate intolerant ideologies by refusing to acknowledge and combat 
the real social harm caused by their existence. Matsuda claims that America betrays its 
ideal of racial equality when it protects hate speech, and can help to rectify this betrayal, 
in part, by expanding government power in the area of hate speech regulation.
Although Matsuda shares the fortress model’s anxiety about the oppressive use of 
state power, she believes that, because of racism, current speech doctrine is a source of 
oppression and intolerance rather than a promoter of tolerance and a protector of liberty. 
Matsuda believes that expanding state power to focus on the voice and conscience of 
dominance relieves subordinate group members of the oppressive claims of tolerance and 
neutrality defended by liberals like Bollinger in his fortress model argument. Thus, 
contrary to Bollinger’s fortress model, Matsuda believes that it is more valuable to 
combat the effects of racism, via speech law, than it is to protect society from the misuse 
of state power in the area of speech law.
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Liberal theory and free speech doctrine allow for exceptions at the margins, and 
Matsuda contends that these exceptions reflect the value judgments of a dominant class 
who refuse to acknowledge the central role of race and racism in American life. Thus, 
according to Matsuda, although liberalism and most free speech doctrine is basically 
sound, some free speech doctrine has been decided according to the values and 
experiences of a monolithic social class that undervalues the importance of issues such as 
race, gender, and sexual orientation discrimination, preventing subordinate groups from 
influencing the value choices made at the margins of speech law. American inequality, in 
her opinion, guarantees that important issues like race are either consciously or 
unconsciously ignored by the dominant group, who hold the reins of official power, and 
fail to acknowledge the political nature of the established vision of speech law. The lack 
of an exception for certain types of intolerant racist speech is itself a special 
circumstance, according to Matsuda, that can and ought to be addressed by emphasizing 
alternative values in a more progressive vision of the first amendment.
After all, even John Rawls acknowledges, in A Theory of Justice, that when
liberty itself is at stake, then the tolerant have the right to curb the rights o f the intolerant,
168even their freedoms of conscience. Dominant group members who use racist language 
comprise a social group that threatens the liberty of subordinate group members, and, 
thus, threatens the liberty of all Americans. This is a special case, Matsuda argues, that 
justifies curbing the freedoms of conscience of this specific social group, but not others. 
Matsuda suggests that speech law already allows various exceptions, and the real, 
pervasive harm of some types of racist speech suggests that a new narrowly tailored
168 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, 192-195.
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exception is entirely consistent with existing doctrine and is also consistent with Rawls’ 
general theory of justice.
To expose the implicit racism hidden by traditional jurisprudence, Matsuda adopts 
a methodology she calls “outsider jurisprudence” as an alternative descriptive model and 
prescriptive vision of speech law. Taking a “highly contextualized” approach to her 
historical and legal analyses, Matsuda attempts to show why the law is a product of racist 
social structures and how the law continues to sustain and even promote racism.169 
Matsuda’s methodology contrasts with a traditional legal inquiry, but she believes that 
this difference highlights the failure of typical free speech inquiries to notice the harms of 
racist speech. For instance, Matsuda’s contextualized approach leads her to reject the 
notion of liberal neutrality in the belief that the law is essentially political, and her 
outsider jurisprudence accepts the notion that the law can and ought to be used by 
subordinate groups as pragmatic tool for social change.170 This rejection o f liberal 
neutrality and acceptance of the notion that the law is and ought to be used in political 
ways, allows Matsuda to choose amongst legal and political principles that she favors, 
rather than conforming to preexisting standards, which she believes are tainted with 
misleading claims of neutrality.
Matsuda identifies speech law’s connection to racism in three doctrinal elements 
of first amendment tradition that she believes her alternative approach exposes; one, the 
limits of doctrinal imagination in creating first amendment exceptions for racist speech, 
two, the refusal to recognize the competing values of liberty and equality at stake in the 
case of hate speech; and three, the refusal to view the protection of racist speech as a
169 Matsuda, “A Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2323.
170 Ibid. 2324.
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form of state action.xlx These limitations of imagination in traditional jurisprudence elicit 
a kind of a blindness that, she believes, affects majority group lawmakers and legal 
professionals who are, as a consequence, insensitive to her proposal. Thus, Matsuda 
believes her alternative perspective, from outside of traditional jurisprudence, illuminates 
the political stakes and political choices inevitably involved with the issue of racist hate 
speech.
In the section of her article entitled Who Sees What, Matsuda questions why the 
world looks so different to her than it does to her liberal colleagues who identify with 
traditional jurisprudence, and she concludes that the identity of the person doing the 
analysis is generally decisive, at least in regards to their respective responses to racist
171speech. Matsuda contends that in advocating legal restrictions on racist speech from 
her alternative vision of the law, she typically finds sympathetic audiences in people who 
identify with target groups, while non-target group members are typically insensitive to 
the effects of racist speech, often labeling this type of speech activity as isolated and 
harmless.172 For Matsuda, this inability or unwillingness of many non-minority liberals 
to fully acknowledge the pervasive nature of racism and its harmful effects in American 
life, leads to their defensive reaction to her proposal, and this defensive reaction often 
draws on claims of legal neutrality that she and her CLS colleges believe are invalid.xx 
The racist structures of subordination are so entrenched in American life that most 
dominant group members are unable or unwilling to see this social reality.
International law provides Matsuda with examples of speech law that she believes 
are more in line with her vision of racial equality. The International Convention on the
171 Ibid. 2326.
172 Ibid. 2326-2327.
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Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination devised a treaty in 1966 requiring all 
states that ratify it to criminalize racial hate messages.173 Since its adoption by the United 
Nations general assembly, many liberal states have taken steps to implement the 
provisions of the treaty into the language of their speech law. The United Kingdom, 
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, for example, have all devised laws restricting racist 
hate speech. Matsuda believes that this international trend is one that America ought to 
follow.
The common element between the international treaty and these different 
countries restrictions on racist speech is that they all recognize a certain form of racist 
speech as particularly dangerous.174 The definitive elements of racist speech according to 
this international view are discrimination, a connection to violence, expressions of 
inferiority, hatred, or persecution.175 This broad international definition of racist speech 
leads Matsuda to consider whether a narrower definition of racist speech could 
accomplish her goal of combating racism while, at the same time, maintaining what she 
views as legitimate first amendment values. As noted, speech doctrines allow for 
exceptions in a few categories of speech that are considered doctrinally distinct. 
Conspiratorial speech, incitement, fraud, obscenity, and defamation are all areas of 
speech that are considered to be uniquely harmful and thus beyond protection. 
Additionally, the law recognizes certain classes of people who get additional protection 
from the law. Thus, with the international trend and these existing exceptions in mind, 
Matsuda proposes a narrow class of racist speech to be considered as a new sui generis
173 Ibid. 2341.
174 Ibid. 2348.
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category of prohibited speech. Matsuda believes that a new exception, analogous to 
present exceptions, could maintain the essentials of speech doctrine while combating 
racism just as child pornography laws, for example, combat the exploitation of children
177without seriously infringing on valuable speech.
In order to protect the structure of the first amendment doctrines which often 
protect subordinate groups, Matsuda narrows the definition of racist speech from her 
international model, and insists that her description of a qualitatively different form of 
racist speech deserves a “non-neutral, value-laden approach” that will better preserve free 
speech for Americans who deserve such rights.™ The defining characteristics of 
Matsuda’s definition of racist speech for which restrictions would be permissible are: 
first, the message is of racial inferiority, second, the message of inferiority is directed 
against a historically oppressed group, and third, the message is prosecutorial, hateful, 
and degrading.178
Matsuda’s first element of racist speech is the primary identifier. All messages 
that portray target group members as all alike and inferior denies the personhood of target 
group members and is directly harmful. The second element connects racism to social 
structures of dominance and subordinance. With this connection, Matsuda devises the 
“victim’s privilege” for minority group members in the belief that racial hatred without 
the position of dominance is impotent. The third element is related to “fighting words” 
precedent in that the language, by its very utterance, inflicts injury on the hearer. 
Recognizing all of these elements as necessary to criminal prosecution not only protects 
minorities from the harmful effects of racist speech, creating a positive zone of liberty for
177 Ibid. 2355.
178 Ibid. 2357.
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minorities, but it also narrows the field of interference with minorities’ speech. This 
preserves minorities’ negative liberties and, according to Matsuda, prevents the kind of
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censorship that many minority liberals fear.
Matsuda recognizes that even narrow speech restrictions could back-fire and be 
applied disproportionately to vulnerable groups, as they have in some countries that 
follow the international standard, such as Brittan and Canada, but she believes that an 
even narrower definition could be developed alongside her more modest race-based 
category to avoid this possibility. Although Matsuda defers the specifics of her narrower 
definition for another analysis, throughout the proposal she considers other groups that, 
she believes, also deserver the victim’s privilege due to additional forms of 
discrimination inherent to American life. Women, gays, and lesbians, Matsuda contends, 
should also be allowed claim to the victim’s privilege under certain circumstances, 
seemingly narrowing the focus of her proposed restrictions.™' This even more narrow 
definition of racist speech would only limit a fraction of hate speech, but, Matsuda 
insists, such restrictions would have significant practical and symbolic impacts on 
American life.
Many types of extreme speech remain protected beneath either of these two 
narrow criteria. Marxist speech, for example, which encourages religious persecution, 
the execution of capitalists, and the destruction of the family, would remain protected. 
Although the various quasi-Marxists regimes that have gained and lost power in world 
over the previous century - such as those symbolized by figures like Stalin, Mao, Kim 
Jung 111, Pol Pot, and Castro - have murdered more people than Hitler and the Nazis in
179 Ibid. 2358.
180 Ibid.
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the name of ideology, communism is race neutral and not universally condemned as is 
Nazism. The overt anti-Semitism of some Nazi speech makes it part of this sui generis 
category, while Marxism, according to Matsuda, is simply part of the political discussion 
that presents alternative views of political origination, distribution of wealth and power, 
and the like. Advocating violence in the name of ideology is different from advocating 
violence in the name of racism. Some Marxists live and work in the United States and 
are respected members o f their communities, while the anti-Semitism of Nazism is 
universally reviled and undeserving of first amendment protections, according to 
Matsuda’s standards.
Many first amendment protections for hate speech would be retained by 
subordinate-group members under Matsuda’s proposal. Although expressions of hatred 
against dominant-group members by subordinate-groups is disturbing to Matsuda, in 
respect for first amendment principles, these expressions, she believes, are best left to the 
market place of ideas.181 Hateful expressions by subordinate against dominant-group 
members should be expected due to stratified social conditions, and may actually be 
therapeutic for the subordinate class. The harm caused by such speech exists, Matsuda 
concedes, but it is of a different degree and easily mitigated by the social privilege of 
dominant-group members.182 Matsuda uses the distinction between public and private 
persons in defamation law to explain her point. Like a public official or celebrity injured 
by defamatory comments, the dominant class has greater access to “safe harbor” and
1 0 1
exclusive dominant-group interactions. The power, wealth, and prestige of dominant
group members mitigate the effects of verbal attacks by minorities, according to Matsuda,
181 Ibid.
182 Ibid. 2361.
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and, when warranted, unofficial responses should apply to unwanted speech considered 
as hateful and offensive by the dominant group.
Matsuda suggests that the dominant group can be differentiated from subordinate 
groups by sifting through social indicators such as wealth, mobility, comfort, health, and 
survival rate.184 In many cases, the statistical status of different groups as a whole would 
determine who is subordinate and who is not under Matsuda’s proposal. The success of 
individual subordinate group members does not, in Matsuda’s estimation, disqualify his 
or her group from the designation of subordinate. Matsuda claims the luck of a particular 
subordinate group member in achieving success is not the same as the privilege of 
dominate group membership. Nor does the relative success of some groups indicate that 
the cycle o f subordination has been broken. Jews and Asians who have achieved 
economic success are victimized in other ways that go unnoticed by statistics.xxl" Thus, 
“fact finders” could assess the relative subjugation of different racial groups in the way
I OC
that lawyers find facts in other areas of the law.
The victim’s privilege becomes problematic, however, when considering 
restrictions on racist speech both within a particular group and between the various 
groups. Matsuda proposes that particular subordinate group’s different standards would 
combine to determine the level of speech rights granted to each group. Some hateful 
racial messages would be regulated by various community standards while other forms of 
“word play” within a particular minority community would be tolerated.186 Each 
minority community would decide what other groups higher on the scale of subordination
183 Ibid.
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may legally say about their particular community, and what the group may say about 
itself and other groups higher on the scale of historical subordination. Matsuda contends 
that over-regulating racist messages generated in subordinate groups would further 
victimize these groups due to a misunderstanding of their linguistic and cultural norms, 
and thus careful scrutiny must apply when restricting the speech of subordinate groups.187
Zionist speech provides an example of how the victim’s privilege could be either 
granted or refused to the same person depending on the pigment in that person’s skin and 
the content of the speech. Matsuda rejects the notion that Zionist speech is racist in favor 
of her “highly contextualized” approach that accounts for the historical context of 
persecution experienced by many Jews. Any hostility within Zionist speech is therefore a 
reaction to historical persecution rather than a tool of dominance, according to Matsuda’s 
standards. Thus, stating that gentiles are mud people without souls, for instance, is 
considered by Matsuda to be a “survivalist expression, arising out of the Jewish 
experience of persecution and without resort to the generic rhetoric of white supremacy, 
[and] is [thus] protected under the contextualized approach.”188 However, should a white 
Zionist claim racial dominance over black or brown people, Matsuda cautions, then the 
victim’s privilege would be refused.
Matsuda contends that within a racist society some racist speech must be allowed 
to maintain discourse about racism while other forms of literary and or historical racism 
no longer need to be tolerated by subordinate groups. News reporters may sometimes 
have to repeat racist messages for the dissemination of news about racist incidents. Law 
school professors may sometimes use racist language for the development of hypothetical
187 Ibid.
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circumstances for educational reasons. Situations such as these would not be actionable 
because these messages are spread for reasons other than racial persecution.189 Public 
museums and private antique collections, however, that do not weigh the benefit of 
historical preservation, such as Jim Crow signs or Nazi paraphernalia, against the harm 
that such artifacts may cause to subordinate group members could be subject to 
regulation.190 Each subordinate group knows, according to Matsuda, which artifacts and 
historical references cause offense and which do not. Realism in books, film, and theater 
would also be subject to the various standards of subordinate groups. Although authors 
such as Mark Twain abhorred racism and used literary realism to expose the hypocrisy of 
slavery, there is the danger, according to Matsuda, that African-Americans may miss the 
irony of the message, and Caucasians may “simply enjoy the racist dialogue on its 
face.”191 Subordinate groups are thus seen by Matsuda as best equipped to decide what 
type of artistic and/or historical expressions, like literature and museum collections, 
should be legally tolerated.
The question of education is of great importance in American life, and Matsuda 
views the university setting as a special case within the free speech issue. The next round 
of Supreme Court decisions in the realm of speech, Matsuda believes, will come from the 
issue of hate speech on the university campus.192 Matsuda recognizes universities as 
unique places with special responsibilities to students who live in a culture of 
subordination. Thus, official tolerance of certain types of racist speech on college 
campuses, according to Matsuda, is more harmful than tolerance in the broader
189 Ibid.
190 Ibid. 2368.
191 Ibid. 2369.
192 Ibid. 2370.
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community. Matsuda insists that many minority students often go to college already at
risk academically, socially, and psychologically. Additionally, Matsuda insists minority
1faculty members are typically untenured, overburdened, isolated, or non-existent. The 
marginalized position of minority faculty further marginalizes minority students, Matsuda 
believes, making these minority students, and other similarly subordinate students, 
unique. Thus, Matsuda asserts that the victim’s privilege should carry more weight on a 
college campus than it does in the community at large. There is a legal precedent, 
according to Matsuda, for considering the race of the speaker and target when 
considering speech prohibitions on campus. Matsuda again recalls defamation law for 
guidance. Dominant group students and faculty could be considered as public individuals 
with implied wealth, power, fame, and ego that make their remarks different and 
susceptible to heightened scrutiny because of their perceived ability to dish-out and 
weather racial attacks. Students are analogous to a captive audience, and subordinate 
students in this position are particularly vulnerable to certain types of hate speech. This 
extra care on college campuses would act as a training ground in the area o f speech. 
Subordinate group students would feel as though they too are part of the larger 
community, if certain types of racist speech were vigorously regulated by school 
authorities, and dominate group students would be taught that they could no longer “get­
away-with-it,” and thus learn more quickly what is expected in social discourse.194
Matsuda recognizes that speech restrictions set the tone for social discourse, and, 
like Justice Harlan, she recognizes that the activity of speech has tremendous potential as 
an educational tool. Like Harlan, Matsuda recognizes that free speech doctrine is itself
193 Ibid. 2371-2372.
194 t u ; ^
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an education that reflects and communicates certain legal themes and social aspirations. 
However, contrary to Harlan’s conception of free speech as an education in general 
tolerance, Matsuda’s proposal seeks to use speech law as a legal means to purge what she 
believes are harmful ideas from certain members of society, thus transforming speech 
doctrine into an education in limited intolerance. Matsuda’s proposal communicates the 
message that if we know nothing else as a society, then at the very least we know that 
racism is wrong. We know who is responsible for American racism, and, as a liberal 
society, we have an obligation to combat the harms of racism by criminalizing the 
messages o f some racists. Although Matsuda acknowledges the legitimacy of many 
traditional first amendment values, like individual autonomy, self-government, and truth- 
seeking, she believes that these values are undermined by legally tolerating the racist 
speech of one group of citizens who need to be taught that they can no longer get away 
with the status-quo of racism.
Thus, Matsuda’s proposal, if implemented, would communicate the general 
message that the elimination of racism is now a government priority that will be 
prosecuted with all the resources and stamina of the state -  a declaration of war on 
racism, so to speak. Ideally, Matsuda seeks to combat racial dominance with “ratchet 
like” measures that include taking advantage of existing practices such as desegregation 
and affirmative action, and also mandating more progressive practices such as her 
proposal for the criminalization of racist/misogynist propaganda and financial 
reparation.195 In the event that these types of government programs end the hierarchy of 
dominance and subordination, then, Matsuda allows, the new narrow category and the 
victim’s privilege could be reviewed and possibly revised to reflect this changing reality.
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Until then, however, Matsuda seeks to bring the politics of race to the forefront of speech 
law.
VI. My Assessment of These Two Visions of Free Speech and Tolerance
We have now seen that legal liberals like Bollinger and critical race theorists like 
Matsuda have conflicting notions of how to handle intolerant speech. They disagree on 
whether tolerance is best served by tolerating intolerant speech or by its regulation. For 
Bollinger, the values that underwrite current speech doctrine reflect both negative and 
positive concepts of liberty, and thus protect the activity of speech for the individual 
while creating an atmosphere in which the principle of general tolerance can be 
experienced, which, in effect, supports the social aspiration of racial equality. 
Alternatively, for Matsuda, the values of the classical model and the value of general 
tolerance are overstated in speech law at the expense of a more progressive understanding 
of racial equality. With Matsuda’s regime of limited intolerance and her victim’s 
privilege, however, racial minorities would enjoy the individual license of negative 
liberty while benefiting from a protective zone of positive liberty. Those without the 
victim’s privilege, on the other hand, would be denied both the negative and positive 
concepts of liberty in this area of speech in order to better secure the rights and liberties 
of racial minorities. Considering these different visions of free speech within the 
American tradition, the question now becomes: which of these two contrasting legal 
strategies best preserves the value of tolerance for now and in the future?
193 Ibid. 2375.
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I find the legal arguments of liberals like Bollinger to be more convincing. 
Bollinger’s tolerance principle is consistent with the values of the classical model and the 
principle is antithetical to intolerant ideologies that threaten liberal institutions. I agree 
with Bollinger’s understanding of speech as different from other liberties, and thus 
requiring greater care and protection to promote the broad value of general social 
tolerance. Although I agree with Matsuda that racist hate speech causes real and 
pervasive harms to minorities, I also agree with Bollinger that these harms do not justify 
legal restrictions on this type of speech. Legal strategies showing tolerance toward the 
speech of the least of us, who express intolerant and insensitive ideas, maintains the 
liberties of conscience for us all. I argue that this strategy defeats intolerant ideologies by 
refusing to instantiate intolerance within the American institution of free speech.
Matsuda’s proposal, alternatively, would alter the American approach to 
intolerant ideas and weaken the well-founded commitment to the general tolerance 
principle. Admittedly, Matsuda’s proposal would have benefits. Such law would shield 
racial minorities from the immediate personal harms caused by the expression of 
gratuitously racist ideas, or provide legal recourse should those ideas surface, but these 
limited, short-term benefits come at too high of a price in the long-term, in my view.
Hate speech restrictions show intolerance towards ideas, and thus seek to mandate the 
manner in which people think. This weakens our commitment to the values identified in 
the classical model, and, as the fortress model warns, foster a general cultural attitude of 
intolerance that could erode other liberal constitutional principles critical to the vigorous 
political life of the American plurality.
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Three additional arguments, I suggest, highlight some negative aspects of 
Matsuda’s proposal of limited intolerance, and buttress Bollinger’s positive justification 
for general tolerance in the area of speech. First, I believe it is implausible that any type 
of hate speech restriction would address the deeper problem of racism, and Matsuda’s 
paternalistic proposal could cause silence on important racial issues, which may actually 
make matters worse. In essence, hate speech restrictions would probably fail to provide a 
greater level of protection for minorities in the long-term than does current speech 
doctrine’s vision of tolerance. Second, hate speech restrictions, no matter how narrow, 
inevitably venture down the slippery slope, jeopardizing truly valuable speech and thus 
jeopardizing core liberal values that underwrite our constitution. Third, Matsuda ignores 
the difficulty of setting out clear standards of exactly what speech is prohibited beneath 
her prescriptions, and this uncertainty violates the liberal principle o f fair notice. Within 
the larger war on racism described by Matsuda, her focused speech restrictions represent 
a “nuclear” option, and the fall-out of this option creates more difficulties in the area of 
speech than it solves.
First, Matsuda’s provides no convincing evidence that her proposal would 
actually combat racism. The narrow focus of Matsuda’s proposal would only cover the 
most obvious forms of racist expressions while other more insidious expressions and, the 
ideas behind them, would still survive.xxlv Social problems involving race are better left 
in the open because it is doubtful that any law could eliminate all forms of racist speech, 
much less racist thought. No country that has adopted strict speech policies has declared 
the defeat of racism.xxv If free and open expression cannot expose and defeat the error of 
racism then why are we to believe that censorship can accomplish this task? Ideological
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censorship has never liberated anyone from oppression, tolerance in area of speech, 
however, has helped many marginalized and disenfranchised people of all descriptions 
claim their civil rights and civil liberties, helping to close the divide between American 
ideals and every-day social practice. Thus, I believe Matsuda’s vision of speech law 
would not achieve its stated goal of combating racism, and would possibly alienate the 
different races from one another, ultimately making matters worse.
Matsuda’s proposal is also paternalistic toward minority communities, essentially 
treating these groups as though they are incapable of defending themselves in the “market 
place o f ideas.” This paternalism might add to the silence on these important issues that 
plague society by attempting to shield racial minorities from offensive ideas that she 
believes they are ill-equipped to handle. In my estimation, constructive cross racial 
dialogue is hindered by such policies, policies which might widen the gap of racial 
misunderstanding and increase the level of racial tension. The prospect of diverse racial 
groups doing battle in court over every utterance that causes offence does not seem likely 
to promote the ideals o f racial unity or equality. Matsuda’s preoccupation with racial 
distinctions in speech law could exacerbate racial divisions in society and polarize social 
factions, rather than reduce the negative effects of racism in the long-term.
Second, even narrow hate speech restrictions, such as Matsuda’s, have unintended 
negative consequences that cause legitimate concerns for legal liberals. According to 
Nadine Strossen, in her article Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest 
Proposal, such legal prescriptions contain three related difficulties that have a negative 
symbolic impact on constitutional values: first, using the discretion of different racial 
group standards to impose this type of speech doctrine involves the danger of arbitrary
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and discriminatory enforcement; second, regardless of how narrow speech limits are 
drawn, there will be a chilling effect beyond their scope; and third, such legal precedent 
could be used in the future to restrict other types of speech beyond any current 
interpretation.196 Thus, according to Strossen, regulations that directly impact only a 
discrete category of speech in fact add to the ambiguity at the margins of speech law
107rather than clarifying them. Additionally, such regulations arbitrarily limit citizen’s 
individual and collective educations, preparing the way for new, future restrictions that
1 O Rcould follow a similar theme of intolerance. Proposals such as Matsuda’s are 
tantamount to view-point discrimination, in Strossen’s opinion, and they would thus 
weaken classical constitutional principles and the moral legitimacy of first amendment by 
showing intolerance toward one type of bias, but not others.199
In my view, the specifics of Matsuda’s proposal justify Strossen’s concerns, and 
indicate why such hate speech restrictions are considered by legal liberals as the “thin 
edge of the wedge” that will inevitably strike at the core of speech doctrine if allowed 
entrance. Matsuda’s sui generis category goes beyond low-value racist speech at the 
margins and could jeopardize valuable speech in the center of American free speech 
doctrine. Matsuda’s discussion of literature and historical preservation indicates that 
valuable or not, if certain groups determine that works of art or historical artifacts are 
offensive, then artistic or historical concerns could lose. If different community 
standards could restrict and edit the words of Twain or Melville, and perhaps Jefferson 
and Lincoln, because of an irrational fear that people will not understand, then, I fear, no
196 Nadine Strossen, “Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal,” Duke Law Journal 
(1990): vol. 484, 520-521.
197 Ibid. 522.
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words or ideas will be safe. America’s very reason for being is undermined if bits of art 
and history can be plucked from our collective conscience by government censorship. 
Matsuda’s proposal could go beyond the stated goal of restricting white racists’ speech, 
and seeks restrictions on how Americans are able to consider ideas about race, which is at 
the core of the free speech ideal. And, with Matsuda’s expanded vision of the victim’s 
privilege - that in addition to racial and ethnic minorities, includes women, gays, and 
lesbians - the wedge widens.
Third, for legal liberals, like Strossen and Bollinger, a clear rule that avoids 
unintentionally jeopardizing valuable speech is essential to the application of speech law 
in a country as diverse as the United States. The liberal principle of fair notice requires 
that a law establish a well-defined rule to provide people with clear specifications of what 
is required of them, thus outlining when and how the state will intervene in their lives. 
Despite exceptions, contemporary speech law meets the liberal requirement of fair notice 
and provides substantial clarity in regards to which types o f speech are protected and 
which are prohibited. Matsuda’s proposal, however, violates this important liberal 
principle o f fair notice and would pose significant difficulties at providing clear legal 
distinctions concerning whose speech is restricted and what force those restrictions carry.
For instance, Matsuda is unclear on how the would-be dominant group would be 
defined. Matsuda’s highly contextualized approach is careful to analyze the status of 
subordinate-groups, but she does not indicate whether or not the same careful approach 
would apply to would-be dominate groups. The so-called dominate group is hardly 
monolithic, and it is unclear what standard would apply to specific subgroups that might 
not easily fit into her categories. The Scotts-Irish communities living in the Appalachian
'"Ibid. 521.
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region, for example, present a peculiar vision of historical dominance under the highly 
contextualized approach. White Anglo Saxon Protestants from New England can be 
differentiated from Acadian and Creole Catholics of South Louisiana by social indicators, 
statistics, and history. The existence of recognizable sub-groups such as these, and 
others, seriously complicates the effort to define the victim’s privilege; though, a clear 
rule defining dominate v. subordinate groups would be necessary if  Matsuda’s goal is 
truly ending the legacy of historical dominance.
Supposing the dominate-group was denied the careful scrutiny of a highly 
contextualized approach, independent community standards would prove equally 
controversial between different minority groups. Surely not every community standard 
would agree with the standards of every other group. Matsuda’s claim that Zionist 
speech is not a racist expression is controversial, for example. Many Arabs would 
disagree with this claim. Similarly, some Jews are offended by portions of the New 
Testament and may press for a ban on certain Christian themes, angering some devout 
Christians in the African-American or Latino communities. Organizations such as the 
Nation of Islam often adopt an anti-Semitic tone that is equally offensive to some Jews. 
Tensions sometimes exist between Japanese and Chinese communities reflecting long 
histories o f atrocity and cultural hatred. Americans of Turkish and Greek ancestry have 
conflicting views of a shared history, and neither group is likely to come to terms with 
the intolerant speech of the other. What about people of mixed lineage who don’t fit 
nicely into a single group? Matsuda’s proposal ignores these and other potential practical 
problems. No uncontroversial standard for assessing protected from unprotected speech 
could exist between many groups. The vagueness and uncertainty of Matsuda’s victim’s
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privilege does not strengthen the margins of speech law, and would fail to provide 
adequate notice of what particular expressions would be allowed by a particular group 
and what expressions would be denied, making her proposal potentially overbroad and 
therefore very difficult to apply consistently. Thus, even if  the law could determine a 
moral and intellectual substance to the distinction of each racial group, the operational 
barriers in determining a consistent and stable rule that could regulate the speech between 
each group, without silencing valuable speech, seem to me insurmountable.
Racial equality is o f course an important American ideal, but Matsuda has not 
demonstrated that her proposal would actually combat racism while clearly 
demonstrating that her narrow category would negatively impact core first amendment 
principles. Her proposal focuses on the symbols of racism rather than the causes of 
intolerance, which, I believe, are generally ignorance and a lack of constructive dialogue; 
and, thus, Matsuda allows the rough veneer o f racist language to obscure how effectively 
free speech has advanced the cause of racial equality. Matsuda’s analysis is so entirely 
consumed by her fear of certain racist ideas, and the people who express them, that she 
seeks to eradicate these ideas through the power of government. Thus, I believe, she falls 
prey to the seductive, though destructive, impulse of intolerance that similarly afflicts 
other ideologues. Hate speech restrictions, although intuitively appealing, would upset 
the balance of mutually reinforcing liberal values that Americans have come to support, 
including the promotion of racial equality, and are thus rejected by many legal liberals of 
all descriptions.
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VII. Conclusion: Closing the Divide
Despite the obvious appeal of the modern liberal concept o f liberty, liberal law 
and free speech are neither intrinsically valuable, nor are they intuitively preferable to 
other conceptions of political values for which other political traditions argue. By 
internalizing and reflecting the value of general tolerance, though, Americans have 
shown that classical liberal ideals can evolve, and now offer a better system of 
organization than any alternative, given our diverse population, conflicted history, and 
modem ideals. Throughout this thesis, we have considered whether or not arguments for 
the protection of certain liberties, as they are embodied in contemporary speech doctrines, 
promote a plausible and compelling account of liberal political values. This thesis 
recognizes speech as providing the possibility for the pursuits of modem liberal values, 
and also recognizes that these political values are of no avail without the social value of 
tolerance. The liberal notion of liberty (read equal liberty) can be understood as having 
been realized through contemporary American speech doctrines vision of tolerance. 
Tolerance has bridged the divide between American political ideals and modem social 
realities.
Although the hard lessons of history and experience have purged most people of 
the quaint expectation of complete social harmony that exemplifies some aspects of 
classical liberal thought, many still have genuine faith in the contemporary American 
balance of liberal values expressed in speech doctrines. The American system of 
government has brought the world a vision of political life that is flexible enough to 
accommodate the challenges of pluralism from one generation to the next while 
maintaining the fundamental value of liberty for most people. American speech law
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provides a valuable example o f how a tolerant society can effectively use liberal 
institutions to check and confine intolerance, and thus indicates how biases of all types 
are defeated through the force o f ideas and dialogue, rather than the force of law. 
Liberalism remains Western philosophy’s most important vision of political life, and 
United States speech doctrines reflect a unique balance of core liberal values, which have 
proven to be dynamic enough to maintain the ideal of liberty while encouraging the goal 
of social tolerance.
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NOTES
1 A modem liberal use o f  the term “liberty” must include the notion o f equal basic liberties for everyone 
regardless o f  contingent differences, while acknowledging the fact that institutions o f  liberty have no ability 
on their own to benefit everyone equally. With this in mind, John Rawls, in A Theory o f Justice, uses the 
term liberty to mean the complex o f  rights and duties as defined by just institutions. (John Rawls, A 
Theory o f Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971; Fourth Edition Reprint, Cambridge, Belnap 
Press, 2001, 210). Broadly, liberty is defined by a system o f public rules that stipulate what citizens are 
either free to do, or not do. The concept o f liberty and the relative worth o f  liberal institutions to people of 
different means is distinguishable, according to Rawls, in the sense that liberty is represented in a complete 
system that guarantees basic equal rights o f citizenship, while the worth o f liberty to any person depends 
upon the individual’s capacity to advance their own interests within the framework the system defines 
(Ibid). An individual citizen’s inability to take advantage o f opportunities because o f  a general lack o f  
means is not counted as a constraint on the value o f liberty in general, but is instead understood as affecting 
the worth o f liberty to a particular individual. This two part understanding o f  liberty allows reconciliation 
between the concepts o f  liberty and equality. In sum, Rawls’ understanding of equal liberty stipulates that 
basic freedoms are the same for everyone, but the worth o f  any particular freedom is not the same for 
everyone. For example, the wealthy, like Ted Turner and Rupert Murdock, are able to take fuller 
advantage o f free speech because they both have the financial resources to get their views broadcast over 
the public air-waves, but this does not diminish the institution o f free speech for the average citizen. 
Similarly, equal political rights are valued less by the a-political who do not vote, than by the politically 
active, but this discrepancy does not diminish the value o f  equal political rights in general. The goal o f  
modem liberal institutions is to protect equal liberty, but this does not indicate an unwillingness to increase 
the worth o f  liberty to the least advantaged. A modem, liberal understanding o f the term “liberty” 
acknowledges the controversies between concepts o f  negative and positive liberty, as described by Isaiah 
Berlin in his Four Essays on Liberty. Both concepts are deeply rooted in liberal political aspirations, and 
the need for both types o f  freedom must be addressed in the structure o f  social rules. For an equitable 
political compromise to emerge from controversies over individual and social needs, though, certain basic 
liberties o f conscience must be secured within the governing system o f rules, and ought not be sacrificed 
for visions o f political life, such as egalitarianism, that promote the freedom o f everyone to participate 
equally in political affairs. The first component of liberty, the most essential component, is in securing 
certain freedoms o f conscience, like freedom o f thought and speech, freedom o f religion, freedom o f  
association, and the like, within the structure o f government. With these fundamentals o f liberty secured 
equally for everyone, the peaceful political debates may proceed between the demands o f negative and 
positive liberty and the equitable balance o f political power (Ibid. 176-180).
" Ronald Dworkin asserts that personal and external preferences are sometimes so inextricably linked that it 
is difficult to separate them. Representative democracies are believed by many liberals to be best suited to 
separate personal and external preference within its political and legal institutions. (Ronald Dworkin,
Taking Rights Seriously, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977; Eighteenth Edition Reprint, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001, 276)
111 In his book Critical Legal Studies. Andrew Altman notes: “The ideas o f  fair notice and legal 
accountability are logically distinct. It is conceptually possible for an organ o f the political community to 
give citizens fair notice o f  its intended actions, yet for those actions to be beyond what the organ is legally 
authorized to do. It is also conceptually possible for an organ o f the political community to create ill- 
defined zones of freedom, thus failing to provide fair notice, yet to act within its legal authority. The 
generic liberal model o f  the rule o f law insists that both fair notice and legal accountability be satisfied.” 
(Andrew Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990; 
Third Edition Reprint, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, 24)
,v Constitution: “the organic law framing the governmental system; the original and fundamental principles 
o f law by which a system o f government is created and according to which a country is governed. A  
constitution represents a mandate to the various branches o f  government directly from the people acting in
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their sovereign capacity. It is distinguished from a law which is a rule o f  conduct prescribed by legislative 
agents o f  the people and subject to the limitations o f  the constitution” (Barron’s Law Dictionary [2003], 
s.v. “constitution.”). A liberal constitution is authorized and legitimized by the people.
Statute: “an act o f  legislature, adopted pursuant to its constitutional authority, by prescribed means and in 
certain form such that it becomes the law governing conduct within its scope. Statues are enacted to 
prescribe conduct, define crimes, create inferior governmental bodies, appropriate public monies, and in 
general to promote the public good and welfare. Lesser governmental bodies adopt ordinances; 
administrative agencies adopt regulations.” (Ibid. s.v. “statute.”)
v Rights neutrality is predicated on the idea that some areas o f  human activity are beyond the bounds o f  
state deliberation and compromise, creating a conceptual “zone o f liberty” around each citizen on which the 
state may not trespass. (Altman, Critical Legal Studies: A Liberal Critique, 24, 72-73) The assertion that a 
relatively stable boundary should exist between individual rights and political activity is a revolutionary 
idea in the history o f  political thought, though central to liberalism. The right to a free conscience and the 
right to own private property are archetypal to rights neutrality, while more could be mentioned, and 
although disagreement exists concerning the details o f  these rights, liberals all agree that rights must limit 
government to protect individual autonomy and thus liberty. (Ibid. 73) Epistemological neutrality, as the 
name suggests, concerns the epistemological basis for arguments that claim individual rights should limit 
government power. (Ibid. 75) In other words, this form o f neutrality concerns the requirements placed on 
permissible arguments for principles and ideals believed to differentiate between the domain o f government 
authority and the domain o f individual rights. This form o f liberal neutrality indicates that government 
ought to be indifferent toward specific epistemologies, but to limit the coercive power o f  the government 
and protect individual autonomy, there must be a conception o f  public reason. (Ibid. 75) The third form of 
liberal neutrality, political neutrality, is intended to assure an institutional arrangement that will distribute 
political power evenly throughout society. Political neutrality mandates that liberal systems o f  government 
remain neutral to the competing conceptions o f  the good  within a plural society. This levels social/political 
power by forcing the differing conceptions o f the good  to negotiate and compromise, accommodating 
different groups and forestalling one conception o f the good  from gaining unrivaled dominance and 
forbidding the others that meet liberal criteria. Political neutrality is subordinate to rights neutrality, 
according to liberals, and the compromise o f  the political process must conform to the limits placed on 
politics by individual rights, which protect and promote individual autonomy. (Ibid. 76) To confine the 
coercive power o f  the state and reinforce the aforementioned principles, liberalism also demands legal 
neutrality, which helps define the process o f adjudication. (Ibid. 76) This form o f neutrality assures that 
once the political process has settled the compromise, and has enacted laws in accordance with the 
previously discussed requirements o f  liberal theory, those who interpret and apply the law do so according 
to political decisions. Liberalism insists that laws should be interpreted and applied by judges who 
disregard the different arguments that went into the compromise, while heeding the spirit and the wording 
o f the compromise. This form o f neutrality implies a separation between law and politics.
V1 The specifications o f  Legal formalism are analyzed in greater detail in section III, see pp. 24-26.
vu Stare Decisis -  “Lat: to stand by that which was decided; rule by which common law courts ‘are slow to 
interfere with principles announced in former decisions and often uphold them even though they would 
decide otherwise were the question a new one.’ 156 P.2d 340, 345. ‘Although [stare decisis] is not 
invaluable, our judicial system demands that it be overturned only on a show o f good cause. Where such a 
good cause is not shown, it will not be repudiated.’ The doctrine is o f particularly limited application in the 
field o f  constitutional law. 298 U.S. 38,94.” (Barron’s Law Dictionary [2003], s.v. “stare decisis.”).
V"1 Not all legal liberals believe that classifying speech as a different kind o f liberty makes much o f a 
difference in the justification o f free speech as a right. Ronald Dworkin suggests that although 
distinguishing free speech from other, lesser liberties sounds plausible, the distinction forces the 
abandonment o f the notion of a right to liberty. Dworkin states, “ ... we shall see it is not easy to state what 
that difference in character comes to,[ the difference between lesser and fundamental liberties] or why it 
argues for a right in some cases and not others. My present point, however, is that if  the distinction
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between basic liberties and other liberties is defended in this way, then the notion o f a general right to 
liberty as such has been entirely abandoned.” (Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 271) The focus o f this 
thesis, however, does not question whether or not we have a ‘right’ to liberty, but instead questions whether 
or not liberty as such is worth protecting once gained.
1X Along side the American regime o f free speech law stands a host o f  possible unofficial responses that 
groups or individuals could conceivably utilize to combat extreme speech. Society can choose to simply 
ignore such disturbing speech, and refuse to validate unenlightened expressions with any response. If this 
proves impossible or ineffective, the content o f  the disturbing message can be verbally attacked and 
rejected as utter falsehood, rendering the message indefensible to all but the most hardened irrationalists. 
Society has the right and the responsibility to challenge unwarranted or unwanted messages through an 
intellectual investigation o f the merits o f ideas that comprise the message, or messages; or, castigation may 
silence or simply defame the intolerant expression. In addition to this option o f counter speech, society can 
choose to shun people who express offensive messages, making a pariah o f those who lack good judgment 
or good taste, labeling people or groups as socially undesirable unworthy o f respect. In many instances, 
vocal extremists risk job security, social standing, and physical well being from a quick-tempered public.
By rallying on the forces o f  indignation and helping society focus its informal power on troubled spots, free 
speech doctrines often allow extremists the freedom to express themselves into social and political 
isolation. The possible unofficial responses to unwanted speech implied by the principle o f  free speech can 
be overlooked, and are sometimes mere aspirations, but this type o f social power is very much reflective of 
American’s cultural ideals o f  individual autonomy and self-government.
x The first ordinance required insurance with any permit for marches in excess o f  fifty persons -  300,000 in 
public liability and 50,000 in property damage -  and assurances given that the group will not “portray 
criminality, depravity or lack o f  virtue in, or incite violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward a person or 
group o f persons by reason o f reference to religious, racial, ethnic, national or religious affiliation.” (Lee 
Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, New York: Oxford University Press, 1986; Reprint, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988, 24) The second and third ordnances were criminal laws, and violation could be 
penalized by up to $500 in fines or up to six months imprisonment. (Ibid.) The second ordinance forbade 
the dissemination o f materials within Skokie which promotes and incites hatred against any person by 
reason o f race, national origin, or religion. (Ibid.) Dissemination o f materials was defined to include the 
display o f signs, markings, or clothing o f  symbolic significance. The third ordinance forbade the wearing 
of military-style uniforms during public demonstrations. (Ibid.)
x' The “fighting words” doctrine o f  Chaplinsky restricts personally insulting epitaphs spoken in face to face 
encounters (Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 32).
X11 The Illinois statute in Beauharnais provided: “It is unlawful for any person, firm or corporation to 
manufacture, sell, offer to sell, advertise or publish, present or exhibit in a public place any lithograph, 
moving picture, play, drama or sketch that displays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack o f virtue o f  a 
class o f citizens, or any race, color, creed or religion, which produces a breach o f  the peace or riots.” 
(Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 251)
Xl" In addition to Mill’s arguments that identify the positive benefits o f tolerating error, Bollinger borrows 
the arguments o f  Lincoln Chafee’s Free Speech in the United States to support the notion that society is 
benefited by tolerating intolerant speech. (Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 55) The legal tolerance o f  
speech believed to be false and intolerant, according Chafee’s argument, identifies extremist elements 
within society, providing a “social thermometer” that notifies the public o f dissatisfaction, resentfulness, or 
ignorance in the community. (Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 55) An open forum that legally tolerates 
such extreme speech allows society to gauge the proliferation o f malcontents and the scope o f  their 
intentions, socially confronting and isolating extremist elements, and discrediting their views without 
threatening free speech law. (Bollinger, The Tolerant Society, 55) Society and its authorities generally 
watch closely the actions o f  those who advertise extremist views in the event that rhetoric turns to action.
A liberal society’s indignation toward hateful messages generally prompts loud criticism while often
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encouraging authorities to scrutinize the actions o f antagonists, effectively placing them beneath the social 
and legal microscope.
X1V The hearings focused on communist ideology, when the real threat to national security lay in Soviet 
atomic espionage.
xv The federal decision in Collin cites the Cohen decision as precedent.
xvl In his Four Essays on Liberty, Berlin discusses his two conceptions o f  liberty -  positive and negative. 
Berlin worried about the positive conception o f liberty being used for oppression, but Bollinger indicates 
that Berlin missed how these two conceptions are linked through tolerant speech doctrines. (Bollinger, The 
Tolerant Society, 173-174)
x™ “Along with other provisions in the Bill o f  Rights o f  the United States Constitution, the First 
Amendment did not purport to constrain state or local governments, but rather limited only the federal 
government. See Baron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7Pet.) 243 (1833). Not until 1931 did the Supreme Court 
hold that the fourteenth amendment (ratified in 1868) made the first amendment’s free speech and press 
clause binding on the states. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).” (Nadine Strossen, 
“Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal,” Duke Law Journal [1990]: vol. 484, 565)
xvni Matsuda’s stories o f  dominance and subordinance are articulated through particular stories o f  majority 
on minority racism only, which are interwoven with more general claims o f social scientists and scholars 
that, she believes, support her assessment o f  what hate speech is, its effects, and from whom it is derived. 
The particular stories included in Matsuda’s account undeniably demonstrate that some people suffer from 
the moral failing o f  racism, but her reductive arguments refuse to acknowledge that everyone is susceptible 
to the moral failing o f bias, in its many incarnations, and bias is the first step toward racism and 
discrimination. Some would counter this argument, as Matsuda does, by contending that bias without 
economic or political power is impotent, and akin to something other than racism, perhaps justifiable 
resentment o f  an oppressive other. Matsuda’s argument that minorities are allowed token political and 
economic power only, negates the possibility o f  any meaningful form o f  minority racism because o f  the 
inability to injure others with bias. The argument that identifies power as a necessary component o f  
discrimination seems correct, intuitively, but to argue that minorities posses insufficient power in American 
society to deal with racist speech is dubious. Minority social power is treated with suspicion or simply 
overlooked by Matsuda’s assessments because minority power does not suit her premise o f a rigid racial 
social hierarchy. Despite continual calls for highly contextualized considerations o f  racial issues, Matsuda 
only uses context i f  it supports her premise o f  subordination, otherwise, she ignores the evidence. For 
instance, the political and economic power o f  minority groups such as African-Americans, Asian- 
Americans, Latinos, and Jews is undeniable. The population increases in minority groups make the sheer 
numbers o f likely voters a political force that elect an ever-increasing number of minority politicians, while 
shaping the policies o f  politicians o f  all races. As with population growth, the economic progress o f  
minority communities is an undeniable reality. Large minority groups, such as African-Americans and 
Latinos, have seen steady increases in the sizes o f their middle and upper-classes since the civil rights era, 
while smaller minority groups, such as Asians and Jews, have a long history o f economic success. This 
argument does not imply that the political and economic situation o f  all minorities is perfect, or ever was 
perfect; many minorities, as well as many whites, feel left out o f the political and economic benefits o f  
American society, but to deny the progress o f minorities in general, and imply group destitution, degrades 
the accomplishments o f  many people. In a further attempt to declare all minority groups as subordinate by 
virtue o f  race, Matsuda claims that distinctions between poor whites and wealthy minorities are 
unimportant when deciding whom is oppressed because these counter examples are the lucky and unlucky 
flotsam and jetsam o f institutionalized racism. Matsuda states: “ The rise and fall o f group status is 
relevant even when an individual is a counter example, because when a group is subordinate, even the 
lucky counter example feels the downward tug. Luck is not the same as privilege.” (Mari Matsuda, “Public 
Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” Michigan Law Review  [August 1989]: vol. 
87:2320, 2362-2363) Matsuda simply does not convincingly make the case that minorities are always, or 
even usually, at the bottom o f vertical power relationships. Any person’s relative position on the vertical
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scale o f social influence is tied to economics and political access, and the economic and political power o f  
minority groups is simply ignored by Matsuda. Matsuda provides no evidence that millions o f educated, 
affluent minorities occupy a lower rung on the ladder o f vertical social relations than whites with similar 
qualifications. Minority business leaders, politicians, and military leaders would have to disagree with such 
an assessment o f  social reality in order to continue in their jobs and be effective. Numerically, more whites 
in America live beneath the poverty line than do African Americans because there are more whites than 
African-Americans, but, regardless, a significant percentage o f  whites, the so-called dominant group, 
occupy low level positions on the vertical scale o f  social influence and affluence, many below minorities. 
This argument does not deny the existence o f racism, it rejects, however, the notion that every social 
phenomena associated with a large, varied group o f people can be summed up in the word “racism.”
x,x Professor Nadine Strossen rejects Matsuda’s claim that the protection o f racist hate speech is a form o f  
state action. Strossen uses the Supreme Court’s understanding o f the meaning o f the Establishment Clause 
as instructive precedent for evaluating Matsuda’s claim o f state action. The court has repeatedly ruled that 
the Establishment Clause’s neutrality and protection o f private religious expressions does not convey the 
message that the government endorses a particular religion. Strossen points to the 1990 decision in Board  
o f Education ofW estside Community Schools v. Mergens, where the Court expressly reaffirmed the 
distinction between government and private speech in terms applicable to the racist speech controversy.
The Court declared, Strossen notes “[TJhere is a crucial difference between government speech endorsing 
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free 
Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.” Analogously, Strossen contends “[tjhere is a crucial difference 
between government speech endorsing racism, which the Equal Protection Clause forbids, and private 
speech endorsing racism, which the Free Speech Clause protects.” (Matsuda “Public Response To Racist 
Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2375; Strossen, “Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A 
Modest Proposal,”545)
xx Matsuda claims that even majority group members who express consternation over racist propaganda 
“share a guilty secret: the relief that they are not themselves the target o f the racist attack,” insinuating that 
vocal racists acknowledge their racism and feel no guilt and whites who deny racism vocally, inwardly 
recognize the racist flaw, and because o f that recognition feel guilt; thus, whether or not they realize it, 
whites are racist. (Matsuda “Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2338) 
Matsuda elaborates the point: “While they [white people who disavow racism] reject the Ku Klux Klan, 
they feel ambivalent relief that they are not African-American, Asian or Jewish. Thus they are drawn into 
willing complacency with the Klan, spared from being the feared and degraded thing.” (Ibid. 2338-2339) It 
is logically incorrect to move from the premise that all Klansmen are white, to the conclusion that all 
whites, in some way, are drawn into complacency with the Klan. Just as it is unacceptable to extend the 
feelings o f fanatical hatred that inspired the mass murder o f  9/11 to all Muslims because all o f  the high­
jackers were Muslim, as some Christian fundamentalist attempted to do, it is equally unacceptable to make 
such demeaning statements o f general white complicity with the Klan. Such generalizations are offensive 
and dangerous. Generalizations about race, culture, religion, political affiliation can only go so far in 
describing a particular group or individual, but Matsuda maintains that her generalizations are adequate. 
Matsuda does not come out and state explicitly that all whites are Klan members, but she deliberately and 
consistently describes the white population in terms of their least common denominator -  Nazi, fascist, 
Klansmen -  in an implicit strategy o f racial indictment. Lest we forget, in addition to racial minorities, the 
Klan vocalizes hatred for the government, Catholics, atheists, agnostics, Humanitarian Universalists, 
homosexuals, bisexuals, transsexuals, communists, unionists, anarchists, and all those who agree with or 
otherwise associate with their political opponents, professing a hatred for whites who reject their narrow, 
twisted world-view along with every one else. Whites who treat others with fairness and dignity have 
neither a moral obligation nor any reason to feel guilty for the Klan, slavery, the annexation o f Hawaii, or 
anything else that they had nothing to do with and do not otherwise support. Matsuda seems to deny even 
the possibility that a white American can avoid racism through a thoughtful consideration o f the evidence 
that proves the equality o f  human kind, followed by corresponding equitable actions o f  justice in everyday 
life.
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XX1 Matsuda claims that “[t]he alternative to recognizing racist speech as qualitatively different because of 
its content is to continue to stretch existing first amendment exceptions, such as the “fighting words” 
doctrine and the “content/conduct” distinction. This stretching o f  doctrine ultimately weakens the first 
amendment fabric, thus creating neutral holes that remove protection for many forms o f  speech.” (Matsuda 
“Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2357)
xxu “While this article focuses on the phenomenology o f racism it includes discussion o f the closely 
associated phenomenology o f anti-Semitism. The same groups, using many o f the same techniques, and 
operating from many o f the same motivations and dysfunctions typically produce racist and anti-Semitic 
speech. The serious problem o f violent pornography and anti-gay and lesbian hate speech are not discussed 
in this article. While I believe these forms o f hate speech require public restriction, these forms require a 
separate analysis because o f  the complex and violent nature o f gender subordination, and the different way 
in which sex operates as a locus o f oppression. They are, therefore, beyond the scope o f  this piece.” 
(Matsuda “Public Response To Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2332)
xxm The evidence for many o f Matsuda’s serious charges o f racism is often flimsy, at best. For example, 
Matsuda states that Asians who experience economic success remain underemployed relative to their 
talents, and her citation indicates why this particular claim is misleading (Matsuda “Public Response To 
Racist Speech: Considering The Victim’s Story,” 2363) The generalization o f Asian-American 
underemployment is attributed, in a footnote, to a single book entitled, Korean Americans and the 
‘Success’ Image: A Critique, by Kim Herth, that, obviously, analyzes Korean-American success as a 
microcosm o f  a much larger community, but this distinct microcosm is not representative o f  all Asian- 
Americans. (Ibid. 2363) Matsuda provides no evidence to justify her sweeping generalizations o f  current, 
systemic Asian-American economic oppression, although that is her charge, and like her other evidence for 
the American racial hierarchy, evidence is either unavailable or inconclusive. Matsuda provides no 
statistics that match wages, education, or trainjng amongst different racial groups.
XX1V There is no convincing evidence that punishment for name calling actually changes deeply held beliefs, 
and, to the contrary, empirical evidence shows that censorship makes forbidden speech more appealing. 
(Strossen , “Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A Modest Proposal,” 554)
xxv Great Brittan adopted hate speech restrictions in 1965. There is no discemable evidence 40 years later 
that neo-Nazi groups, such as the National Front, have been negatively impacted. Many racist groups, such 
as the National Front, thrive in Brittan today, and some believe that racism is actually a more pervasive 
problem in Brittan than it is in the United States. (Strossen, “Regulating Racist Speech On Campus: A 
Modest Proposal,” 554)
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